Papers and Documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Volume 2, 1921 (Budapest, 1946)
Documents
1921 47 Mr. Samal also that a rapprochement with Czecho-Slovakia would not be very welcome to large sections of the population of Hungary, where many people urged conciliation or even a personal union with Rumania in order to protect ourselves against Slav oppression. Therefore no Government, however peaceful, could suppress the agitation of the masses without a reasonable likelihood of at least a moderately satisfactory settlement of our claims. Mr. Samal took notes of my statements and promised to discuss with Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Tusar whether the stability of Hungary and internal conditions in Czecho-Slovakia would permit the beginning of negotiations with Hungary. He was either to call on me or send word through Dr. Scheu as to what could be done. On January 9, Mr. Benes requested me to call on him. 1 My interview lasted from 11 a. m. to 1.30 p. m. He opened the conversation by saying that he was informed about the talks I had had with Dr. Boucek and Chancellor Samal and he would be glad to hear from me directly what I had in mind. I explained that I was acting on my own initiative when I conveyed to some of my influential friends in Hungary, who are on good terms with the Government, the peaceful aspirations of Czecho-Slovakia, repeatedly emphasized to me by responsible Czech officials. These friends urged me to continue my explorations. I then briefly summarized the conversations I had with Mr. Tusar and Mr. Samal. Mr. Benes said that he was fully acquainted with the substance of these conversations; as far as he was concerned, he attributed no importance to irredentist propaganda in Slovakia. He then proceeded to state his own position. He said that he was a sincere politician, actuated only by good intentions towards everybody; he would not, in any circumstances, interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. This, he continued, was shown by his refusal to intervene in Russia, although his best friends urged him to do so. Neither had he intervened in Hungary although he could easily have occupied Budapest during the period of Communism in Hungary [Sic!]. He believed in the equitable and peaceful settlement of disputes. He was not afraid to act even contrary to public opinion, as shown by his policy in the Polish question. He had already improved relations with Austria and he would like to do the same with Hungary. Of course, the 1 Cf. infra, Doc. No. 65. 2 Cf . supra, Doc. No. 52.
