Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1988 (15. évfolyam)
1988 / 1. szám - A tanulmáynok orosz és angol nyelvű tartalmi kivonata
György Szentesi: The conclusion and significance of the Soviet—American agreement on the complete elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons On 8 December 1987 Gorbachev and Reagan signed an historic Soviet—American accord completely eliminating two categories of ground-based nuclear weapons, namely the operational-tactical ones of a range of 1,000 to 1,500 km and those of a range of 1,000 to 1,500 km. In this connection there rightly arise some questions which the author tries to answer by discussing aspects that form an integral part of the accord. The question most commonly asked and perhaps of the greatest importance concerns the real value of the accord. The qualitative and quantitative parameters of the two classes of nuclear weapons involved as well as the analysis of the treaty provisions and the procedures established for the destruction of weapons and for verification lead the author to conclude that the new Soviet—American agreement is a precedent-setting and forward-oriented one of the highest importance in the history of disarmament efforts. For analyzing the Soviet—American agreement the author relies on the relevant Memorandum as well as on numerous tables he has compiled on the basis of the SALT I and SALT II accords, which serve to bear out his conclusions. Accordingly the special importance of the new Soviet—American agreement is corroborated by the evidence of the author’s statements to the effect that — this is the first arms control and disarmament accord to provide for effective cuts in armaments as against the SALT I and SALT II accords, which, equally important in their time, checked rather than halted the quantitative growth of strategic nuclear warheads; — the absolute majority of the weapons to be destroyed under the accord consists of ballistic missiles as the most dangerous vehicles of nuclear weapons and represents only an insignificant ratio of the weapons destined for scrapping anyway; — the nuclear warheads to be destroyed under the terms of the accord constitute 6 to 8%, rather than 3.5 to 4% as supposed, of those in possession of both sides; — the elimination of the nuclear weapons involved results in major arms reductions. The author is seeking an answer to another question frequently asked, probing into the reasons why in December 1987 the Soviet Union came to find acceptable what had been unacceptable to it in November 1983 and wondering if the fact that the Soviet Union is to destroy a much greater number of weapons than the United States actually reduces the security of the Soviet Union. In the author’s view the answer lies in the „sufficient security” doctrine, in the new „reasonable sufficiency” security concept of the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, the new Soviet— American accord is the first significant proof of the new security policy while demonstrating that imbalances in the different areas of armaments are to be corrected by.more cuts by the side having an edge over the other rather than by after-arming by the side at an disadvantage. László Demus: The contribution of Hungarian foreign policy to the process of European security and cooperation Despite limitations of space, the author has attempted a broad survey of ihe principles, goals and possibilities of Hungarian foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the approach of Hungarian diplomacy to the process of European security and cooperation. The analysis is divided into three chapters and several subsections. The introduction covers the international conditions for the emergence of détente, the forces working for and against détente, the path leading to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the prospects for the process of détente. The presentation of the international environment is followed by an analysis of the principles and objectives as well IX
