Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1985 (12. évfolyam)
1985 / 1. szám - KÖNYVEKRŐL - Kolos Miklós: Timothy W.Stanley - Ronald I. Danielian - Samuel M. Rosenblatt: Az Egyesült Államok külgazdasági stratégiája a nyolcvanas évekre
Péter Hardi The Second Phase: The United States in the Light of Reagan’s Re-election The foreign policy choices of the United States like generally of great powers are determined by three areas of interests: i. strategic and security interests; 2. (national) economic interests; and (linking to the value system) ideological interests. These three spheres of interests do not still determine a unified foreign policy. One of the central assertions of this study is that the spheres of interests only partly coincide, rather result from each other; but partly they contradict each other. These controversies have strengthened since the taking of office by the Reagan administration. World power commitment, as one of the basic principles of the current American value system and perception, is in contradiction with a host of other interests and values guiding the American socio-political practice. World power role-playing, especially its Reaganian interpretation, namely the enhanced leaning on military power and interventionism, contradicts liberalism and democracy, moreover to the neoconservative ideology openly taken by the administration, in view of both international political norms and home policy. From the controversies indicated by the election results the conclusion is not that “Reaganism” has failed but that the ideological buttressing of the Reagan activity is false. In other words: Reagan does not make steps which should have been dictated by the neoconservative ideology used to justify his deeds. Today there is no comprehensive thought-system in the American political life which could be suitable for the appropriate interpretation of socio-economico-political practice. Miklós Losoncz Western Strategic Conceptions and Their Implementation in East-West Economic Relations The study reviews the changing and development of the strategic conceptions of the OECD member countries during the cold war period (1946—5 3), the period of transition (1933—63), liberalization (1965—72), détente (1972—75), and during the Carter (1976—80) and Reagan (1980—84) administrations. The western strategic conceptions focus on American views and doctrines. The present study examines and analyses the initial suppositions of certain strategic conceptions that have become doctrines in the light of both the Soviet Union’s and the western world’s position, as well as their aims and the internal political and international barriers and the possibilities of their implementation or rather, their feasibility. The study concludes that the aim of the western strategic conceptions showed a high degree of continuity, they were directed at weakening the Soviet Union’s power and international influence in the period after the Second World War. The linkage of economic and political issues and the promise of preferential treatment in western economic relations in return for political concessions, helped to realize these aims. The various means and priorities of the linkage were often modified between the boundaries of the two extremes of total denial and conditioned co-operation. There is a close relation between the cost of individual strategies and their nature, as well as the prevailing American positions in the world economy and the prevailing state of the international power balance. Total denial, so characteristic of the cold war era, turned into selective denial, conditioned cooperation with the weakening of American positions in the world economy and in the period of détente. This policy did not put so much pressure on the resources of the United States and its allies. The harder tone adopted by the Reagan administration was the consequence of the strenghtening of American-positions in the world economy their gaining ground in the electronics industry. This improvement, however, was not sufficient enough to win the support of the allies to help implement America’s strategy of confrontation. Following a close scrutiny of the internal political and international barriers of the implementation of the former strategic conceptions coupled with the knowledge as regards the truth contents of the suppositions, in the future one can expect the idea of indirect encircling to come once again into the foreground of western strategic conceptions, i. e. the process aimed at reducing or rather, subduing the Soviet Union’s possibilities in the'other parts of the world is likely to gather momentum. This would reduce direct confrontation and high tension in East-West relations. It is easier to reconcile the idea of indirect encircling with the spirit of competition prevalent in western societies than the strategy based on directly influencing East- West relations which entails the restricting of competition through administrative intervention (widespread export controls, etc.). Western countries expect this strategy will enable them to maintain their technological superiority as opposed to the CMEA countries. As a [result of the changing of western strategic thinking socialist countries have to face new kinds of challanges. V
