Itt-Ott, 1992 (25. évfolyam, 1/119-3/121. szám)

1992 / 2. (120.) szám

about his or other’s nationality, but, of course, everybody bore his own specific frustrations. They were all united in bringing down the dictatorship, confident that, if successful, the causes of each and every one’s major discontent would simply disappear. The casualty figures in Timisoara (December 16-20), as well as in Cluj or Tirgu Mure§ (after December 20), are telling evidence of a true solidarity during those crucial days. These figures reflect almost faithfully the ethnic composition of the region. As a friend of ours in Tirgu Mure§ (Marosvásárhely, chiefly a Hungarian city) said, “if Hungarians ever waved the Romanian flag, that was in December 1989.” A lot of would-be emigrants changed their minds: it seemed that their common predicament would not further permit that the differences turn into conflicts and repression. This optimism was based on the reality that the uprising in Timisoara had been sparked by Tőkés László; his resolute resistance to illegal and forced removal from office was supported not only by his Hungarian parishioners, but also by many Romanians, Germans and Serbs, all living in the same city. Actually, it seemed that it was finally clear that good and reliable relationships were in everybody’s interest, as Ceau§escu’s last attempt to accuse foreigners and minorities of threatening the country’s sovereignty did not work out.

This confidence was also enhanced by the first official declarations of the new establishment. The National Salvation Front, which seized power after Ceau§escu’s flight from Bucharest, in its first communiqué, issued and broadcast nationwide on December 22, pledged “to observe the rights and freedoms of national minorities and to ensure their full equality with those of the Romanians.” (3) The newly formed government reassured public opinion, nation- and worldwide, that it planned guarantees for ethnic minorities: “The free use of the mother tongues of the minorities, promotion of national culture, defense of ethnic identities were to be ensured; a new government ministry charged with supervising the welfare of Romania’s ethnic minorities would be created.” (4) Transylvanian Hungarians were also promised that the Romanian government would facilitate the free circulation of press printed in Hungary, and that a network of relay transmitters would be set up in a short period of time so that the Budapest TV channels would be accessible to viewers in the most remote areas of Transylvania. All the minorities organized themselves into ethnic unions. The most powerful is, obviously, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR), which after the May 20, 1990 elections emerged as the second largest party in Parliament, holding eight percent of the seats.

However, not everybody was happy with such commonsensical perspectives. As mentioned before, all high, and almost all low-level officials, party activists, Securitate and army officers were Romanians. Therefore, as soon as they realized that their wheel of fortune had turned downward, they also realized that the only way for them to avoid losing face and, possibly, to remain in power, was to break up the freshly forged solidarity into various warring factions. What these people aimed at, in the first place, was to be looked

upon not as individuals who had (or had not) collaborated with the previous, hateful regime, but as part of the Romanian people, endlessly threatened or despised by malevolent and ruthless “others.” These former officials were joined by many mediocre, but ambitious, individuals who, in order to push themselves forward, had no other asset but their pure Romanianness. And so the old and well-known nationalistic discourse was reactivated soon in January, 1990. A self-proclaimed cultural organization, Vatra romäneascä (the Romanian Hearth) came into existence in February, 1990. Very soon it turned out to be a kind of fundamentalist organization whose declared concern was (and still is) to defend the Romanian majority against the minorities. Nobody seemed to realize the absurdity of placing the majority in the defensive role of a minority. Of course, the arch-enemy was identified with the Hungarians, both those living in Romania (about two million) and those living in Hungary or elsewhere in the world. Immediately, rumors were spread that Hungary was ready to “take over” Transylvania. Never since the end of World War II has Hungary voiced any claim of this sort. Nevertheless, the ghost of the country’s dismemberment was repeatedly and successfully let out of the cupboard by Ceaugescu, the Securitate and their scholar henchmen, in order to maintain ethnic tensions, which also provided helpful scapegoats and diversions from the real problems. It worked out successfully for Vatra romäneascä, too.

Leaders of the minorities thought that once the dictatorship was overthrown, they could speak their minds freely and, accordingly, asked that their rights be fully observed. They mostly claimed cultural and community facilities. But after the short brotherhood and euphoria of December, 1989, these claims were promptly labeled as privileges by the guardians of Romanian values against the onslaught of the minorities. This has been the situation since the beginning of 1990. There have been few changes for the better. While the Romanians are constantly urged to take pride in their national identity, any manifestation of self-esteem of the minority groups is branded as chauvinistic and meant to endanger the status quo.

The problem is why all these manipulations are so popular among a large majority of the Romanians. Unfortunately, the xenophobic propaganda of the Ceau§escu regime has been effective. Even if they did not believe all the pseudo-historical nonsense they were told, most Romanians were glad to accept the self-assertive image created about Romania and the Romanians. That people had practically nothing else from which to derive pride or satisfaction. Also, as free debate on ethnic differences had never been allowed, latent resentments and frustrations exploded all of a sudden, and one of the first freedoms people discovered was the freedom of hate. The latter is abundantly fueled by various publications furiously inciting the population against the minorities and some of their leaders, and against any foreign interference with the Romanian mind and soul. A very powerful agent in spreading the nationalist, chauvinist, anti-semitic, xenophobic propaganda is the weekly magazine Romania Mare, published by Eugen Barbu and Corneliu

ITT-OTT 25. évf. (1992), 2. (120.) szám 27