Hungarian Studies Newsletter, 1974 (2. évfolyam, 3-5. szám)
1974 / 3. szám
DISSERTATIONS* Brown, Victoria Farr, (U. of Washington, 1972) “The Romanian National Party and the Integration of Transylvania into Greater Romania.” 349 pages. Microfilm and xerox order no. 72-28, 581. The Romanian National Party, created in 1869, was for almost half a century the single political voice of the Romanians in Hungary. Once Transylvania was tranferred to Romania, the National Party (NP) faced many challenges to its hegemony. The National Party’s fundamental problem was the loss of its original reason for existence: “the struggle against Magyar oppression.’’Obviously too well entrenched simply to disband itself, the party had to find some new and compelling issues and strategies to prevent the loss of its powerful constituency and its own leading members. Internally there soon was much quarreling where earlier there had been unanimity of views of the party’s goal’s (if not always on its tactics). Externally the NP was threatened by the encroachment of other political groupings both from within Transylvania and from the former Old Kingdom of Romania, the country’s political center. Other difficulties of the National Party included the hostility of King Ferdinand, the generally unsettled nature of Romania following the war, and the centralizing policies and the vast experience in political manipulation of the Transylvanians' principle rival, the Liberal Party under Ion Bratianu. The study deals with the nature of these challenges and the NP reactions to them. The behavior of the NP’s leaders in power is the subject of one principle section of the study. The party leaders made up the Consiliul Dirigent which ruled Transylvania provisionally immediately after the war. The Consiliul’s work and the circumstances surrounding itsillega dissolution, together with the effect of the disbandment of the NP, are discussed in detail. Likewise, the short-lived government of prominent NP member Alexandru Vaida-Voevod is analyzed and the reasons for its failure assessed. The study’s final major division deals with the problems faced by the National Party in opposition. The loss of both national and provincial power produced a profound crisis within the NP ana led it to rethink its ideological commitments, to revamp its political tactics, and especially important, to seek ties with Old Kingdom parties. The study describes the NP’s fusion with the Old Kingdom Peasant party and attempts to evaluate the significance for Romania’s future of the fusion and the events and decisinons which led up to it. Komjáthy, Anthony T. (Loyola U. of Chicago, 1972) “Three Small Pivotal States in the Crucible: the Foreign Relations of Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia with France, 1934-1935.” 217 pages. Microfilm and xeros order no. 72-25, 100. The status quo created by the Versailles and connected peace treaties was based on the supposition that the existing conditions would not change: France would remain the strongest power in Western Europe, her Central European allies would follow her servilely, and Germany would remain weak and isolated. By 1914, although the borders marked out by the peace treaties were still the same, the international conditions changed to the disadvantage of France. The decline of France’s economic and military power, the decline of French trade with Central Europe, the constantly reoccuring domestic political crises, and furthermore, the strong desire of the French politicians and public opinion to preserve the peace, avoiding open confrontations with Germany, forced the French statesmen to revise their former foreign policy. The basic principle of their new plan was the creation of a new alliance system (Eastern Pact, Danubian Pact), which would guarantee the security of France without real French participation. This hidden aim of France was recognized by Central European statesmen, who began to search for alternative solutions. The detailed, pragmatical analysis, the examination of reasons leading to the actual decisions of Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and the criticism of these decisions is the essence of this study. Using interviews and unpublished documents, the author attempts to prove that France failed and Germany succeeded in Central Europe, because the German diplomacy understood and used the national interests ofthese three states for its own benefit, while France did not even try to understand them, and with this policy not only alienated the small Central European states, but also pushed them into Hitler’s arms. The review and analysis of the Austrian, Hungarian, and Yugoslavian relations in 1934-1936 suggests the conclusion that with a better, more understanding policy, France could have closed the door to the German penetration of Central Europe, could have denied vital raw material from the German rearmament program, and in doing so could have prevented World War II. (*) Abstracts are based on those published in Dissertation Abstracts International. Microfilm and xerox copies of the original full dissertations may be obtained from Xerox University Microfilm, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106. When ordering, use order number shown. EDITORS CORNER It is with deep sorrow that we record that John Lotz has departed from our ranks. His brief biography and detailed bibliography, about 20 typed pages, deserve publication. Lack of funds hamper our efforts to publish them as a supplement to our next issue. (It would make the issue twice as large.) Please, send your contribution to the John Lotz Memorial Fund, Hungarian Research Center, P.O. Box 1084, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903. The continuous flow of letters and contributions to the substance of the HSN are extremely gratifying. Space has become a problem. Mostly a problem of funds. For the same reason, our sponsoring institution will not be able to continue mailing the HSN to non-subscribers. Your and your library’s cooperation would be highly appreciated. We acknowledge the correspondence, encouragement, and publishable material from Eva S. Balogh, Enikő Molnár Basa, Desi K. Bognár, Kalman Bognár, István Deák, Mary Edelenyi, Scott M. Eddie, William Solyom-Fekete, István Fodor, Andrew György, George H. Floffman, Béla Kapotsy, Andor C. Klay, Cornel Lengyel, Jean Park, Peter Pastor, Allan H. Smith, Joseph St Clair, Halsey Stevens, Joseph Széplaki, László Toth. Many personal thanks to all of you. The Editor 8 NO. 3, 1974, HUNGARIAN STUDIES NEWSLETTER
