Hungarian Heritage Review, 1987 (16. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1987-06-01 / 6. szám
feature of ®Ije 3Montl| any military help in sight from Sweden or Turkey. For these reasons, Russian overtures to Hungary were enthusiastically received. A pro-Russian policy was developed as soon as Du Pres arrived in Transylvania. Although Peter’s nomination of Rákóczi to the Polish throne did not please the Hungarian prince, Russia’s offer of friendship came at a propitious time. Bela Kopeczi has even argued that the tsar’s initiative in turn helped Rákóczi out of international isolation. Such a claim, however, is exaggerated. Peter never followed up his offer with concrete support. In his memoirs Rákóczi claimed that his positive response to Peter was motivated by expectations of the tsar’s help in securing the Hungarian throne for Elector Maximilian Emmanuel of Bavaria, and the Transylvanian one for Rákóczi himself. Neither option was pursued by Peter. Following the arrival of David Corbea at Rakoczi’s headquarters in Szerencs, Sándor Nedeczky was sent to meet with Peter to present the Hungarian counterproposals. Because Stanislaw was favored for the Polish crown by the French whom Peter I sought for mediation, it was suggested that Peter support his candidacy. In return for the tsar’s support of the insurgents in Hungary, Rákóczi offered their backing for Russia’s expansion in the Balkans. Although in his memoirs Rákóczi provided an explanation for his enthusiastic response to Russian’s overtures, the messages he sent to Charles XII and to the sultan indicate ulterior motives. These demarches justified Hungarian action on the grounds that the insurgents, failing to obtain support from the Turks and Swedes, had to prevent a Russo-Austrian alliance. This argument was a ploy to gain the approbation of the Swedes and Turks who could not but fear such an eventuality. At that point he privately dismissed the possibility of such an alliance. Hopes of bringing the Swedes or the Sublime Porte around proved fruitless. The news of the new Hungarian alignment angered Charles XII; Constantinople paid no attention to Hungarian requests for a limited number of troops. De Ferriol was infuriated by the new Hungarian position which now aimed to sabotage his efforts to bring about a Turko-Russian war. Louis XIV was also opposed to the new Hungarian policy as it hampered his aim of inducing Sweden to support France and, ultimately, the Hungarian cause. The French monarch’s envoy in Hungary, des Alleurs, became hostile and attempted to create a rift among the new allies. As a result, des Alleurs, never popular with the insurgents, soon came to be detested and suspected by them. Following the shuttle diplomacy of Sándor Nedeczky and a new visit by Corbea, the terms between the prince and the tsar were settled in Warsaw on September 14, 1707. This was done in the presence of Peter and Rákóczi's Russianspeaking commander in chief, Count Miklós Bercsényi. Defined were Russia’s responsibilities on Rakoczi’s election to the Polish throne. The terms provided a compromise between Peter’s original offer and Rakoczi’s counterproposals. They included a Russian commitment of mediation to reestablish Hungarian and Transylvanian independence, the latter under Rakoczi’s sovereignty. In case Rákóczi had to flee Poland, he was to be compensated with territories in Russia. While the Russo-Hungarian negotiations were taking place, the Hungarian insurrectionaries dethroned the Habsburgs at the Diet of Onod on June 13, 1707, and the estates of Transylvania invested Rákóczi as prince regnant. The Hungarian estates declared an interregnum when the kuruc armies temporarily succeeded in clearing Hungary of Imperial troops. The terms of the pact between Peter and Rákóczi, which Bercsényi signed in Warsaw, were ratified by Rákóczi on October 5, 1707, in Ungvar (Uzhgorod). Although Peter signed it only in the spring of 1708, the document was backdated to December 21 (10). The treaty has been praised by post-World-War-II Hungarian and Soviet historians as the only international agreement ever signed by Rákóczi, conferring legitimacy on his endeavors. Yet the pact had little practical significance and consequence. France, which never recognized the Rákóczi insurrection, supported it with material, money, and some men. Peter never intended to match this. The Maritime Powers, which also failed to recognize Rákóczi, participated in active mediation. Russia could not emulate this for it lacked international clout. Vienna's refusal to accept Russian mediation, however, was not followed by military assistance to the insurgents, as had been promised. For Rákóczi, therefore, international recognition was no victory. Peter’s plans for the Polish succession of Rákóczi soon fell through, much to the latter’s satisfaction. The tsar was still threatened by war and did nothing to aid the Hungarians militarily. Nor did Peter ever send envoys to urge his coreligionists to stop helping the Habsburg cause, even though Rákóczi issued a patent of liberties for the Serbs. This was a true setback for Rakoczi’s plans, as he expected that with Peter's encouragement Hungary’s Serbs would cease fighting the Hungarians. Reprinted from Brooklyn College of the City University of New York Studies on Society in Change (War and Society in East Central Europe). Editor-in-Chief: Dr. Bela K. Király; Co-Editor: Dr. J.M. Bak. Distributed by Columbia University Press. Peter Pastor is a Professor of History at Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New- Jersey. JUNE 1987 HUNGARIAN HERITAGE REVIEW 21
