Hungarian Church Press, 1968 (20. évfolyam, 2. szám)

1968-06-01 / 2. szám

HCP Vol XX Special Number•w> 106 *-•

(07810)

is not right to dwell exclusively on these negative phenomena» Even the simplest sense of human justice would require that the right historical and ethical appraisal of a given revolution should not be without considering the violence and forceful methods used to uphold the unjust and inhuman status quo and the sufferings caused by it — perhaps not conspicuous but prolonged sufferings — and, on the other hand, also taking into account the gradually appearing advantages of the new, lore jus^ more human and more comprehensive order resulting from the radical transformation (it is obvious that we axe speaking of "just revolutions", those which actually usher in such changes).

In order, therefore, to remove the stigma from the word "revolution'' in traditional Christian thinking, we should first realize that, in the social ethics of theology, the word revolution - as clearly distinguished from put oho which bxing about only superficial, changes, and also from counter-‘revolutions which, from the social point of view, constitute a regression denotes only that inevitable and necessary historical process which brings about the comprehensive, radical and rapid trans far nation of those ossified and unjust conditions which would resist any other method aiming at a change, ard, at the same time, means a definite step forward in the direction of asserting the claims of humanity as well as attaining the fullest possible realization of human rights* When, in theological ethics, we speak of revolution in a positive sense, then, as a matter of course, we mean only the latter type of radical transformation*

The ethical justification of revolution raises two further theological questions of practical consequcnce0 First: docs not the above appraisal of revolution contradict what the Apostle Paul says in the well-known 13th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans? "Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinancD of God (theou diatagb); and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation" (v0l2)« It is, however, only in its full historical and Biblical context that we can argue with this muchquoted text» First, Paul does not speak of the whole of an existing economic, social or political order but only of the relation of the believer to the concrete secular authority (to use the modem theological terminology: what Paul says pertains to "personal ethics" and not to "social ethics")} On the other hand, it is obvious that obedience to the civil magistrate is in Paulas mind not absolute or unqualified but belongs to the context of our comprehensive obedience which we owe to God (Acts 5:29)* And, what is still more important, Paul?s injunctions refer to an authority of which he himself says in this chapter that he serves the good order of things in a way as to merit the following description: "He is the minister of God to thee for good"; he defends what is good and punishes evil (13:3, 4)0 When, therefore, we speak of a "just revolution", or of revolution in the ethioal sense, wo by no means advocate revolt agxinst a civil magistrate constituted according to Romans 13: 3,4, that is, the secular authority that protects what is good and punishes what is evil, thus upholding the order of society-The second objection might be raised by theologians who mintáin the absolute authority of Reformation theology, also in matters of social