1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
- The lav doee nőt grant the party more authority than what it needs to fulfill its guaranteeing function;- The party'a competence may nőt exceed the authority it derives from the lav;- The party'a actiona may nőt conflict vith the lavs that are in force;- The party muat exercise ita executive povera openly, in a controllable and accountable manner. It vili be neceaaary to specify which body vithin the party ia to exerciae the party's conatitutional prerogativea. Tvo basic aolutions present themselvea. One of the aolutions has emerged from the internál debates vithin political acience: The Preaidential Council vould be abolished and replaced by a head of State vho is independent of the National Assembly. Power vould be divided betveen the head of State and the National Assembly. This vas the constitutional arrangement in the Hungárián People's Republic from 1946 until 1949. The difference nov vould be that the party nominates the [candidate fór] head of State. Dnder the other solution, Bome governing body of the party vould exercise executive povers directly. It seems expedient to choose the Central Committee fór this role. Among the party's permanent bodies, the Central Committee comes closest to the National Assembly in termB of representativeness and mode of operát ion. The Central Committee can be expected to make executive decisions in public session, and to publish in the press its resolutions that are binding on the State administration. The advantage of the head-of-atate solution is that constitutionally it ie the more simple and provides a flexible framevork fór the separation of the party and State, vhich is to be continued in future. Its dravback is that the party's governing bodie6 retain their opportunity to administer the State from behind the scenes. The other solution is constitutionally more cumbersome. Bút it includes the statutory regulation of the party's executive povers, vhich ve regard as a decisive advantage. Of course, a combination of the tvo Solutions is alsó conceivable, bút ve vili limit ourselves to the second solution fór the sake of simplicity. The Lav on the Party vili have to define the Central Committee's executive povers.- It vili be varranted to assign foreign, alliance-related obligations to the Central Committee's competence. This includes obligations stemming from the resolutions of the Warsav Pact or CEMA bodies, and from friendship agreements concluded vith member nations of the Warsav Pact. The National Assembly vould retain the right to be consulted on such mattéra. It vould *» 4 4^
