Novák Ádám (szerk.): Fontes Memoriae Hungariae III. Varsóban őrzött magyar vonatkozású oklevelek, 1439–1489. Közreadja: Novák Ádám, Tóth Orsolya és Tóth Péter (Debrecen, 2019)
Sobiesław Szybkowski: Polish-Hungarian Relations between 1437 and 1490. A Short Introduction
XXVI intervention which would have helped the supporters of Corvinus, his diplomatic pressure definitely played a significant role in the war. Eventually, due to the abating conflict over Bohemia (a peace treaty was signed in Olomouc on 7 December 1478), the Hungarian ruler no longer needed his Prussian supporters. They were mentioned in the Polish-Hungarian armistice concluded in Visegrád, but in the peace treaty signed in Buda on 2 May 1479, Corvinus promised to stop supporting Tungen and Truchseß and to induce them to accept the authority of the Polish king. Without the Hungarian monarch’s support, Nicolaus von Tungen humbled himself before Casimir Jagiellon on 15 July 1479. In exchange, the king confirmed his appointment as the Bishop of Warmia. Grand Master Martin resisted a little longer, but eventually he reconciled with the king too. On 9 October he swore to observe the Second Peace of Toruń, therefore accepting the vassalage to the Polish Crown and the territorial division of Prussia established in 1466. 84 In the last decade of the reign of Matthias Corvinus (1480-1490), his rivalry with the Jagiellons was still not over. However, his main political focus was the conflict with the Habsburgs. Eventually, he defeated Emperor Frederick III and gained control over certain hereditary Habsburg countries including Vienna (1484-1487).85 The duties of the ageing Emperor were gradually taken over by his son, Maximilian, who was elected King of Germany by the prince-electors in 1486. His attitude towards the Hungarian king was acquiescent. As the result, they made a truce in 1487 and then peace in 1489, leaving all Austrian countries to Corvinus.86 Matthias himself was more and more inclined to reconcile with the Habsburgs. The reason behind this was the dynastic situation in Hungary. The king, who had been in power since 1458, had no rightful heir. Therefore, he was trying to strengthen the position of his natural son, John whom he saw as his successor. He hoped that improving his relations with Frederick III and Maximilian I would induce them to support his dynastic plans. Despite all that, he did not stop taking actions which were supposed to weaken their position. This was made possible due to the unusual impolicy of Frederick III who excluded Vladislaus II (King of Bohemia and a Prince-elector of the Holy Roman Empire) from the election of Maximilian in 1486. This step undermined the alliance between the Jagiellons and the Habsburgs. It was at this point that the 84 Długosz, Lib. XII/2. 421–423., 427–428., 430–432., 435–439.; CEXV, Vol. III. Nr. 279.; Kozłowski, 1897. 12–17.; Schmauch, 1933. 170–176., 183–186.; Górski, 1982. 491., 494–495.; Pósán, 2009. 442–444.; Baczkowski, 2014. 182–186. 85 Baczkowski, Krzysztof: Walka o Węgry w latach 1490–1492. Z dziejów rywalizacji habsbur sko-jagiellońskiej w basenie środkowego Dunaju (further: Baczkowski, 1995B). Kraków, 1995. 14.; Engel, 2001. 306.; Kalous, 2009. 274–278. 86 Baczkowski, 1995B. 15–16.; Kalous, 2009. 280–281.
