Fáklyaláng, 1961. február-október (2. évfolyam, 2-10. szám)
1961-10-23 / 8-10. szám
8 Hungarian Torchlight intensely unpopular and universally feared by their compatriots, attacked defenseless people. The anger of the crowd was intensified when white ambulances, with Red Cross license plates, drove up. Instead of first aid teams, AVH police emerged, wearing doctors’ white coats. A part of the infuriated crowd attacked them and, in this way, the demonstrators acquired their first weapons. Hungarian forces were rushed to the scene to reinforce the AVH but after hesitating a moment, they sided with the crowd. Meanwhile, workers from Csepel, Újpest and other working-class districts learned of the situation by telephone. They seized trucks and drove into Budapest, obtaining arms on the way from friendly soldiers or police, or from military barracks and arms factories known to them. Prom about 11 p.m., the Radio Building was under attack with light arms and, at midnight, the radio announced that clashes had taken place at “various points” in the city. During the early hours of 24 October, the demonstrators seized the Radio Building", but were driven out of it again. At the offices of the Communist Party newspaper, Szabad Nép, other AVH guarcfr opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. Later, insurge"-£s who had obtained arms overcame the AVH and occui sd the newspaper offices. While fighting was in progress at the Radio Building the first Soviet tanks made their appearance in Budapest at about 2 a.m. on 24 October, and were soon in action, However, no official announcement was made of the Soviet intervention until 9 a.m. THE ARMED UPRISING Before referring to the Russian troops, Budapest Radio had announced at 8:13 a.m. that Imre Nagy had been recommended to be the next Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a night meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ (Communist) Party. Half an hour later came a statement that summary jurisdiction had been ordered, and this was read by the announcer as “signed by Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers”. Only after this at 9 a.m., was it reported that the Government had “applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary.” No indication was given as to the manner in which this alleged application was made. In spite of the skillful manner in which the radio presentation of developments gave the impression that Mr. Nagy was responsible for decisions some, remembering his opposition to arbitrary measures and his fight for the relaxation of the regime, suspected a fraud. Moreover, Mr. Nagy had no official status the day before. If the appeal for help had, indeed, come from him, it was realized that the Soviet forces from Cegléd and Székesfehérvár could not have arrived in time. The first shots at the Radio Building marked the beginning of a hard-fought, five-day battle, in which the people of Budapest found themselves in combat with Soviet armor and with the AVH. The ordinary police sympathized with the insurgents, giving them weapons or fighting at their side. Certain units of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the insurgents, but the Army as a whole disintegrated from the start of the uprising. Wherever they could succeed in doing so, Hungarian soldiers handed over weapons and ammunition to their fighting compatriots and, in very many cases, deserted, individually or in groups, to their ranks. However, in general, the senior officers were pro-Soviet and the insurgents mistrusted them. There was no single instance recorded of Hungarian troops fighting on the Soviet side against their fellow-countrymen. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS A serious episode occurred on 25 October, which greatly embittered the people and turned popular sympathy away from Mr. Nagy, whose part in the alleged invitation to the Soviet troops remained obscure. Soviet tanks guarding the Parliament Building, in which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers had his offices, opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, in support of the AVH. This massacre, in which many people lost their lives, shocked the nation. The Hungarian people did not know at this time that Mr. Nagy was detained at the Communist Party Headquarters when the Russian tanks were firing on the unarmed crowd. On the same day the insurgents derived some encouragement from the news that Ernő Gerő had been replaced as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party by Janos Kadar. The following day Mr. Gerő sought the security of Soviet tanks—and later Soviet territory. The former Premier, András Hegedűs, Vice- Chairman of the Council of Ministers, also fled from the Communist Headquarters. Mr. Nagy was now free to move to the Parliament Building. On 27 October, he formed a Government into which he invited both Communist and non-Communist Ministers. These included Zoltán Tildy, former Head of Sate. Béla Kovács, former Secretary-General of the Independent Smallholders, and Ferenc Erdei of the National Peasants. The non-Communists, however, were serving in a personal, non-prrty capacity and several “Stalinists” were retained. With the departure of Messrs. Gerő and Hegedűs, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ (Communist) Party announced that the Government would start negotiations with the USSR for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces. On 28 October, Mr. Nagy’s Government ordered a cease-fire. Fighting stopped largely on the insurgents’ terms. Apart from the successful adoption of guerilla tactics by the fighters, larger groups of the insurgents had withstood Soviet tanks in strongholds such as the Corvin Block. At the Kilián Barracks, Hungarian Army units had fought successfully against repeated attacks under their leader Colonel Pál Maiéter, who had gone over to the insurgents after being sent with instructions to fight against them. FÁKLYALÁNG HUNGARIAN TORCHLIGHT A Monthly Review of Hungarian Issues EDITOR: MIHÁLY HÓKA 418 Central Park West New York 25, N. Y. PRINTED MATTER PLACE FOR STAMP
