Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1998. [Vol. 5.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 25)
Studies - Tamás Magyarics: From the Rollback of Communism to Building Bridges: The U.S. and the Soviet Block Countries from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968
trade union organization had already clashed with the administration over the sale of corn to the Soviets in the early 1960s, and now its representative again emphatically gave voice to their political concerns regarding the proposed East-West Trade Bill. Goldfinger declared that " ... /T/rade relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our Nation's foreign policy. Therefore, the Report should have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect of this issue. ... Moreover, we should have no illusions about the ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist attitudes and policies ... Recognition of these realities should result in greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo concessions than is contained in the Report. In my opinion, there should be no expansion of trade, extension of Government-guaranteed credit or MFN /most favored nation/ tariff treatment without political quid pro quo concessions from them. ,.." 3 7 The gist of the debate was whether the so-called spillover effect was a proper strategy to deal with the Communist countries or not. The idea was that gains in one field, say, in trade, will influence other areas, for instance political life. Actually, the goal was to turn the economic, cultural, and technical exchange gains into political capital —and that is exactly why the leaders of the Communist countries were afraid of opening even toward seemingly innocent fields, like scientific exchanges or even art exhibitions. The East-West Trade Relations Bill was killed in Congress. Consequently, President Johnson issued an Executive Order on October 7, 1966 in which he stated that it was a "national security interest" for the U.S. to provide credits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria through the Export-Import Bank. 8 The Johnson Administration took every opportunity to "educate" the American people, to explain them that the unilateral embargo-policy hurt only the U.S., while the West-European countries took the opportunity to fill in the vacuum and established lucrative trade relations with the eastern half of the continent. The data suggest the victory of the conservatives on both sides: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria exported into the U.S. in the value of American Foreign Policy. Current Documents, 1966. Washington, D.C.. 1969. 438. s The data are taken from the Hungarian Commercial Councillor Endre Kovács's report on April 29, 1968. New Hungarian Central Archives, KÜM XIX-J-l-j. USA TÜK 4-5. 00316/3. 84
