Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1993. [Vol. 1.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 21)

STUDIES - Csaba Czeglédi: On Constative and Performative Utterances

kind of speech acts are constative utterances? They are by no means speech acts that can be true or false. Such speech acts do not exist. Every utterance is performative, because every utterance is the performance of an act: a speech act Indeed, the expression performative utterance is a tautology. Therefore we have two options: we either modify the sense of the term constative and reinterpret the original distinction thus retaining it in a new sense which is compatible with the (intuitively convincing) original idea or discard the distinction as untenable. Austin opted for the second alternative. I do not think, however, that one has to pay such a high price for rescuing the theory. We have at least two reasons to choose the less expensive option. The so-called constative utterances are different in an important manner from the so-called performatives. Secondly, a careful consideration of the nature of our problem reveals the intriguing ambiguity of the term utterance, which, it seems, must take some responsibility for the conflicting conclusions that we were forced draw above. Utterances like (4—5) are systematically different from utterances like (1—3). The typical consequence of saying (1) is that the meeting will begin, and that the meeting will be considered open by everybody concerned. Moreover, for the meeting to be considered open, it is a precondition that (1) must have been said (by a specific type of speaker in specific circumstances, neither of which will be discussed now). A consequence of issuing (2) or (3) is that if the speaker "does tell somebody" he will become answerable for that, and that for him to become answerable for it, it is a precondition that he must have said (2) or (3). To issue (4—5) (as opposed to (1—3)) is to issue utterances that correspond to sentences which in turn are semantically characterized as expressing statements. To issue (4) or (5) (as opposed to (1), (2) or (3)) is to perform the act of making a statement. Pragmatically, the speech acts performed in saying (4—5) are statements. Statements are just as much speech acts as promises and openings of meetings. It is true that normally nobody feels cold as a consequence of saying (4), and that anybody may feel cold without saying anything like (4), and that the way (5) is printed is totally independent of saying it; its content may be false (as indeed it is), but its existence is indisputable. 16