Magyar külpolitika, 1930 (11. évfolyam, 1-7. szám)

1930 / 3. szám - The War Guilt

August1930 HUNGÁRIA LLOYD 19 account of sheer prejudice. If international loans were transacted in íuture under the shield of the new International Bank, borrowing countries eertainly could, and probably would, be relieved írom this strain. It would only be natural, in the event of the International Bank proving valuable not only in theory but alsó in practice, tliat it should in time so develop as to become the eentral currency institution of Europe, similar to the Federal Keserve Board of America. The consequences of such a development are not to be predicted. It is probable that the riank will slowly acquire centről over those eentral banks which, by keeping accounts at the Bank, will deliver part of their assets to her. ün the order hand, it needs a well-defined and careíuiiy-inougüt-out policy on behaif of the Bank if this 'Federal Keserve System of Europe" is to work itself out to the benetit of all participating nations. If Alonsieur Briand's idea of a European h ederation is ever to be realised in practice, I think the International Bank will form tne angie írom which the íinancial and economic co-operation of the European nations will be approached. XThe War Guílt by Gábriel Weis. The War Guilt is still actively debated. And that is as it should be. No good can come of sewing up a wound without a previous cleansing. It is highly desirable, indeed, inat the question continue to De neld in a fluid state, and not allowed 10 assume a rigid form. Ail alike, victors and vanquished, wouid only gain by a írank confrontation of the factors that led up to the catastrophe. -üpon a just determinaüon oi the responsibility ultimately hangs the future peaceful co-operation of Europe. Had the War been less cotly and of shorters duration, its instigation would have been viewed in the iight oi a credit itenij and the winning stalesmen, mstead of shifting the responsibility, would ! have been eager to assume it. BismarcK never I showed anxieiy to discaiim the potential author- j ship for the War in 1Ö/U. By 1 a u n c h i n g his spirited diatribe last year in Current Üistory against the complacent Versailles version, Proiessor H. E. Barnes precipitated the second, more sober, stage in the consideration of the War Guilt. Proiessor Barnes periormed then a most useful public service— usef ul, if not quite as brave as it would seem, any more than the outspoken stand now takeu by somé on Prohibition. Brave it would have been, if the searching representation had been issued at the time when the hypocritical fog thickly enveloped the deliberations at Paris, resulting in the dictated all-ruinous Treaty. But even the usefulnes of Professor Barnes's position is m arred by its lack of diserimination. Professor Barnes goes astray in two respeets. First, in overstressing the other side, to the point even of making it appear as the one only side. He bends far over the crooked timber, and then leaves it in that state, instead of readjusting it to a levél position—a method hardly befitting the even temper expected in a histórián. And, secondly, in failing to distinguish between what in philosophy is known as Efficient Cause and Final Cause. It is generally conceded, except by the D i e H a r d s, that all the nations of Europe were more or less war-minded. Nonebut participatud in the rivalry of armament. None but had a hand in the Formation of ailiances and counter-alliances. In sum, whether of purposes of defence or aggression, all prepared for the eventual armed outbreak. Now, all this comes under the head of Final Cause. As regards the Efficient Cause, a different picture presents itself. Germany, being the most confident in its power to wage war successfully, was the most reckless of them all. Germany had the least reason of any for wanting war; but Germany was alsó the least fearful oí its advent. Let those who strive to exonerate Germany call to mind that it was not Germany's utter peacef ulness which averted war when Kussia rumbled against the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; nor during the period of tension with Francé which developed out of the Moroccan affair; nor when she openly parádéd her sympathies while the Boer War was in progress. Arrogating, then, for a moment the róle of hypothetical 'luture histórián,' I am moved to assess the degree of War Guilt in the following order: Under the aspect of Efíicient Cause: 1. Germany. 2. Russia. 3. Francé. 4. England. Under the aspect of Final Cause: 1. Francé. 2. liussia. 3. England. 4. Germany. Advisedly I leave the Dual Monarchy unclassified. And this because a major clash between it and Servia was, from either angle, a régiónál inevitability. No one not intimately acquainted with the long succession of harassing incidents culminating in the Serajevo outrage, can with any degree of fairness and competence judge of the uncontrollable explosive nature of the situation. Other Powers, in those trying days, might have acted with better foresight and greater tact, but no self-respecting people would have remained scripturally passive at the brutal provocation, or even been less violently reactive. It was a life and death matter for the Monarchy. And it had to be death. Poor Austria! Poor little Hungary! Had there been no Alsace-Lorraine score to settle; had there been no naval supreinacy and trade preponderance to assert; had there been no internál unrests to divert and no Straits of Constantinople to covet—there would have been no world-war growing out of a régiónál clash. To epitomize the whole situation: With the one side it was a case of doing it first; with the other it was a case of meaning it all the time. Let us be fair! It is the only beneficial way in the end.