Magyar külpolitika, 1930 (11. évfolyam, 1-7. szám)

1930 / 7. szám - Hungarian reconstruction. Lecture delivered by Iván Hordóssy before the League of Nation's Union at Chelsea on December 10th

26 HUNGÁRIA LLOYD December 1930 In 1914, we went into another war on tlie side of Austria. Few people reálisé thai ai the Emperial Conference, held previously to the outbreak of the war in Vienná, there was only one man opposing the coming war at this congress and this man's name was Count Tisza, the Premier of Hungary. We did not wish to have a war, because there was nóthing for us to gain, even in case of victory. We have had over twenty millión people living between our pre-war Eroutiers amongsl which there were only eleven millión Hungarians and nearly nine millión other nationalities. Our country has beeen described by several foreign scientists as the most perfect geographical unit on the whole European continent. It was surronnded by mountains and rivers in the north, east, and soutb, while there was only a very short space of boundary faring Austria, where we do not possess a natural frontier. We have been perfeetly satisfied with our situation, and if we entered into the war in spite of all these circumstances, it was only on aecourit of our loyalty towards the monarch who was erowned with the holy erown of our first king, St. Stephen. One of the first and most important milestones of our history was the so-called Golden Chart or Golden Bull, issued in 1222; that is, very shortly after the date of the Magna Charta, in England, which granted to the nation the right of armed resistance against any unlawful acts of the crown. But the Hungarians possessed alsó a very strong instinct of attachment to the leader, which was developed through centuries of incessant fighting into a strong sense of loyalty to authority, and an almost Werwhelming public spirit; a sense of duty, discipline and patriotism. King Andreas, in the 12th century, once sub-. dued a whole army of rebels, headed by his own brother, by simply challenging them unarmed with the words: „Let me see who dares to lay hands on his lawful king." Five centuries later, Maria Theresa, pressed by all her enemies and forsaken by all her friends, threw herself on the loyalty of Hungary, which had then hardly recovered from the wounds received from the previous Habsburgs, yet the whole nation, forgetting past bitterness, came to her defence in an outburst of enthusiasm. These opposite poles, these centrifugai and centripedal forces are, as I told you previously, the chief components of the very complex Hungárián character. The Hungárián is the born loyalist as well as the born rebel, and it was often decided by the hands of fate only which of these two should get the upper hand en him. No wonder that the Hungárián history is so rich in tragedies, arising out of the conflict between these two forces. Sometimes these tragedies assumed gigantic proportions, when nearly the whole nation was torn between the contrasting calls of duty, namely loyalty to authority, and loyalty to the nation. Referring to pre-war conditions, you may sav that the Hungarians might have been satisfied, butwhat about the other nine millión nationalities. It is easily possible that in certain cases mistakes and faults have been made, but the fact, only, that these nine millión nationalities could preserve their language and national cnlture in spite of living under Hungárián rule for centuries and centuries, is a proof thai the Oppression which we have been, and are still sometimes accused of, could not been as serious as our opponents like to advocate it to the outside world. And there we come to the present Hungárián problems; problems which are expected to be solved, not only for Hungary's sake, but alsó on account of the many interests which are directly or indirectly involved in them. The Peace Treaty of Trianon, following the greal World War, deprived Hungary of two thirds of her territory and population, of her most important national resources, nearly all her mineral wealth, all her iron, gold and siíver deposits, and salt mines; 80% of her coal, 90% of her forests. She has lost her most valuable industrial districts, the protecting wall of the Carpathian mountains with their wild, romantic scenery and world renowned Spas, with splendid hotels built by the Hungárián State. She has lost her access to the sea, and her traffic system was completely paralysed, main railway lines were eut off; her navigable rivers and canals were bottled up, and she was deprived of the best markets of her products. To make a rough comparison between the Peace Treaties concerning Germany, Bulgária, and Hungary, allow me to state that the Peace Treaty of Versailles has taken away one of every tiuenty Germans. The Peace Treaty of Neuilly has torn away one of every tiventy Bulgárián speaking Bulgarians. Whilst, on the other hand, the Peace Treaty of Trianon has torn away seven of every tiventy Hungarians of Hungárián tongue. The same comparison could be made concerning the territorial losses of Germany, Bulgary and Hungary. In this respect I only wish to mention that Roumania alone has received a larger proportion of pre-war Hungary than the whole territory of Hungary is to day. A further consequence of the Trianon Treaty is that the country is surrounded almost on all sides by a powerful political and military combination ealled the Little Entente, consisting of Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia, which came into existence by the Peace Treaty at Hungary's expense, and whose chief aim is theréfore the maintaining of the status quo, and the keeping of Hungary in permanent helplessness. The territorial re-adjustment gave them an almost complete control of Hungary's central traffic and foreign trade. Military clauses of the Peace Treaty, and the one-sided disarmament of the opponent, gave them alsó a crushing military superiorrty. Hungary has an army of thirty-two thousand men, without any Air Force, having no artillery, tanks or any other modern equipment. Even the keeping of gas masks and other means of defence for the protection of the civilian population is strictly forbidden. By contrast, the peace numbers of the countries hostile to Hungary are: Czecho-Slovakia, sixteen hundred thousand men; Roumania, two hundred an/1 thirty two thousand men; Jugoslavia: 150.000 nren the totál; five hundred and forty two thousand ment agpmst the thirty two thousand soldiérs of Huiif/ary. But it is only in peace time. In the case of mobilisation the combined armies