Calvin Synod Herald, 1979 (79. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1979-03-01 / 3-4. szám
4 CALVIN SYNOD HERALD his former subordinate, Sir Henry Clinton, to lead the British to a quick victory. Clinton possessed not only previous experience in colonial affairs, but also good psychological judgement. He was aware that not all colonists are supporting the revolution and drafted a strategic plan giving major consideration to this underlying fact. By sea, he sent about 3,000 selected and well-equipped mercenaries under the command of Brigadier General Augustine Prevost and Lieutenant Colonel Campbell from New York to the south. Their assignment was to occupy the two most important southern ports: Savannah in Georgia and Charleston in South Carolina. Afterwards they were to move north, reinforced by loyalist militiamen and attack Washington’s forces deprived of their southern manpower and supply. According to this very imaginative plan, Clinton wanted to fight the war against the American rebels with American resources. Washington had realized the grave danger rather late. By December 29, 1778, Savannah was occupied by the British, and Washington ordered the Legion to the south only on February 2, 1779, together with the forces of Colonel Armand and Captain Schott. He could not risk sending any more troops from his own army without provoking a devastating attack by the northern forces of Sir Clinton stationed in New York. After quickly capturing Savannah in a surprise attack, General Prevost moved his army enforced by loyalist groups to the north and reached Charleston with his advance guard on May 11, 1779, the day when the infantry of the Legion arrived after a long forced march from the north. The total force of the Legion hardly exceeded 150. Nevertheless, this small group displayed a strange contrast in spirit to that of the population of Charleston which was at its lowest possible ebb. Both the Loyalists and the patriots frightened by exaggerated reports about the strength of the British Army, estimated at 78,000 mercenaries and loyal troupers, urged the surrender of the city to avoid massacre. Even Governor Butledge was hesitating. Only John Laurens supported Moultrie’s protest, who commanded the American forces in the city. The appearance of the Legion changed the mood of the citizenry from despair to hope. Pulaski paraded his Hussars on the streets and soon forced his way into the City Council. When hearing about the plans to surrender, in his indignation he protested in a mixture of three languages, and as a federal general he emphatically rejected the idea of capitulation. It was a new and unsual voice for the hesitating city fathers and the determination to fight gained new strength from the confidence of the young general. Pulaski told them that regardless of their decision he would immediately attack the British advance guard which stood a few hundred yards before the fortifications of the city. Pulaski wanted to show to the frightened people of the city that one can conduct offensive, not only defensive warfare against the dreaded mercenaries. Therefore an extremely audacious but potentially successful plan was worked out. First, the cavalry would attack the enemy lines and when their rows had been broken the Hussars would turn around and feign retreat towards the city. In this manner, they wouid entrap the British in pursuit into the concentrated fire of the rifle companies of the Legion. Anyone only faintly familiar with the old Hungarian cavalry tactics will agree that this plan must have been originated with Kováts and was only ordered by General Pulaski. Pulaski’s brave exhortations at the city council were soon known all over the city and thousands of citizens became spectators of the bloody drama occuring outside of the walls. The Hungarian commanding colonel of the cavalry started the raid with deathdefying courage against the surprised and confused British infantry. The mercenaries faced stubborn defenders among the patriots but this was probably the first time that the “rebels” attempted an all-out attack against their ranks. This was the psychological element which caused the battle-experienced British infantry regiment to fall apart. Those not killed by cavalry sabres began to recede. Unfortunately, the infantry of the Legion which was supposed to stay in ambush position started to advance behind the cavalry and prevented them from turning back toward the city without interference. The British regiment was one of the best trained and experienced units in the British forces in America. Its members soon recognized the true situation, recovered their courage and began to counterattack. Within minutes, they destroyed the intermingled Legion infantry and caused irreplacable damage to the Legion’s cavalry. Kováts himself was mortally wounded and during the withdrawal fell dead from his horse. The place was marked by a marble column by the American Hungarian Federation in remembrance of the first Hungarian hero in the American War of Independence. The best epitaph was given by Skelly, a British major, who had participated in the battle, writing into his diary on May 12th: “This was the best cavalry which the rebels ever had.” The British now commenced a general attack against the walls, but Moultrie’s artillery was too much for them. Later that day negotiations were initiated between the commander of the British forces and General Moultrie. On May 12th, an American cavalryman who was intercepted by the British, brought a message to Moultrie that General Lincoln with 4,000 men was moving in accelerated marches toward Charleston. Prevost, in the knowledge of the death-defying cavalry attack of the day before and because of the successful artillery attack against his forces, was no longer sure of capturing the city. He assumed that he could not score an easy victory against the dedicated defenders. Kováts’ example restored the morale of the city. Prevost, afraid to be caught between two fires, ordered withdrawal to the south the next day.
