Antal Tamás: Törvénykezési reformok Magyarországon 1890-1900. Ítélőtáblák, bírói jogviszony, esküdtszék - Dél-Alföldi évszázadok 23. (Szeged, 2006)

A JOGÉRT MINDHALÁLIG - SUMMARY

eventual mistakes. Hence the Criminal Procedure Law (Act XXXIII of 1896), which was prepared under the guidance of Dezso Szilagyi, was greatly praised and unanimously adopted — partly due to the concept of final jury trial. However, the Act on the Organisation of the Jury and the later Act that enacted the Criminal Procedure Law (XXXIV of 1897) was contested by the Opposition. The debate was a little academic considering the fact that the jury de lege lata already existed in the Criminal Procedure Law. For this reason, the use of the jury could not be prevented — only hindered. The most heated debates took place concerning the drawing-up of the master list and the jury summons list. The Opposition supported the usual method saying that it was the best way to guarantee the independence of jury members from the executive powers. However, to ensure the minimal standard of professionalism, the bill included a method of selection by committees instead. The debate was significant from at least one aspect. There was the theoretical possibility that a completely pro-government jury could be set up if public administration issues prevailed in the selection criteria. Seen from this aspect, it was the courts that would be the most suitable means of selection. Nevertheless, many showed distrust towards judges as well because, as has already been mentioned, judges did not enjoy complete independence from the Ministry of Justice. In the end, the parliamentary committee of justice drafted a compromise solution: judicial and public administrative members should both be elected to the delegating committees to keep an eye on each other. This practice, however, did not vindicate the concerns of the Opposition relating to the selection of juries. After researching the professional literature of the time, I could not find any article that attacked the organisational rules of the jury. All criticism centred on the regulations of the Criminal Procedure Law. The legal profession, however, gave the jury a mixed reception: some lawyers — particularly the academic lawyers — idolised it, and saw it as an modern institution which was in complete conformity with European values, and which was an embodiment of the undoubtedly independent administration of justice. Others, then, were of the opposite opinion. They considered it an almost diabolic institution that spoiled the judicature and subverted the gravity of criminal proceedings. Many practising lawyers regarded jurors as incompetent and tried to prove the atavism of the jury system by enumerating verdicts that, from a dogmatic aspect, proved to be nonsensical and by expounding the western findings on the psychology of the jury. The introduction of the jury system in Hungary in fact took place not because of its infallibility. In the late 19

th century a jury meant the sine qua non of the rule of law in every developed European country. Since there were no constitutional courts at the time, people regarded it as the means that would break legal positivism and govern laws. They also thought it would balance the text-based power of judges as there was a general disbelief in judges throughout Europe then. On the continent — except for Spain and the Netherlands —, the jury was praised and regarded as a victory of liberal democracy. Hungary itself could not evade the mainstream since the idea of a unified Europe already existed at that time, although it did not last for long.