Ságvári Ágnes (szerk.): Budapest. The History of a Capital (Budapest, 1975)
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vincial town elects 114 men to its board, the largest Budapest district, Erzsébetváros, as an independent administrative district, elects ten, with another five for the new administrative district connected with Kőbánya, that is, fifteen members altogether. The bill envisages fourteen constituencies, to be formed from fourteen projected administrative districts, and these constituencies would elect on equal ten members to the board each; thus the bill replaces the only just and logical equality of political rights, by an equality of rights based on districts, by a territorial equality of rights. We express our desire that the universal, equal and secret suffrage incorporated in the law should not be debased by such disproportionate municipal constituencies. Whether we set up the municipal constituencies in line with the twenty-two parliamentary constituencies, or according to administrative districts, the principle can only be equality of rights in just proportion. Instead of the plan put forward in the bill, we recommend the following measures: Members and surrogate members of the Municipal Board should be elected according to the parliamentary constituencies or administrative districts. Each constituency should elect the number of members and surrogate members due to any given constituency according to the percentage of voters in the said constituency out of the whole number of voters in the capital. 3. The bill includes the institution of permanent tenure for members of the Municipal Board. This system is in flagrant contradiction to the elective principle which links the mandate to a definite period of time. No permanent vote of confidence is possible within an autonomous system. Life presents many a saddening example of people who having risen by the favour and confidence of the people, misuse their position from individual and selfish motives. The mandate is given by the enfranchised citizens, and they have the exclusive right of revocation or renewal. We therefore object to the system of permanent tenure for members of the board and assert the right of the vote and equality. And if the government retorts that this system has been introduced in the organization of the county and borough municipalities, we reply that equal rights must be uniform everywhere, and that the principle of equal rights is violated by any system of permanent tenure, in the capital and in the province alike. But in this field the bill discriminates still further between the capital and the provinces. The Act on the reorganization of public administration provides that not more than 5 per cent of the members of the Municipal Board may be elected for life. The municipal bill, on the contrary, provides for 32 members elected for life to the board which is 16 per cent, i.e. more than three times the 5 per cent for the provinces. But not only the number of these permanent members, but also the manner of their election, gives rise to the suspicion that this is not so much a matter of rewarding public merit as the organization of binding links with the government party, through the exclusion of the enfranchised citizens. The bill is based on the system of proportional representation. Members of the Municipal Board are elected on this system. The Central Board is formed on this principle, but under this bill even the Municipal Council is elected according to the system of proportional representation. But appreciation of the merits of unselfish public work must not be the privilege of certain parties. Deserving committee-men enjoying public esteem and respect are to be found in every political party, and these men must not be excluded when the reward of merit is put to the vote. 107
