Verhovayak Lapja, 1955 (38. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1955 / Verhovay Journal
January 19, 1955. Verhovay Journal PAGE 11 One of the most salient features of communism in Hungary as elsewhere is the universal sense of security and fear of arbitrary action by the omnipotent state, be it the loss of a job, deportation, or arrest. As a recent eyewitness account puts it, in Communist Hungary terror “has become a way of living and thinking.” The all-pervasive apparatus of terror and surveillance consists of a network of organizations which closely observe the activities of citizens everywhere and act as communism’s ruthless punitive arm against alleged and potential offenders alike. At the summit are the secret police, as well as the Communist Party’s intelligence network manned by some seventy to eighty thousand party diehards and the central control board. On the lower levels are the so-called social controllers, informers who are selected by Communist mass organizations and who report to the local counci's in cities and in villages; tenants committees wno, assisted by janitors in apartment buildings, keep a close watch oh the tenants’ movements and activities: and finally a" series of other informal mechanisms which complement the machinery of terror and intimidation. Yet the very existence and need of institutionalized terror aggravated by the presence of the Soviet troops is in itself clear evidence of widespread restlessness, and dissatisfaction, and the numerous examples demonstrating how individual Hungarians effectively counteract secret police work are a high tribute to their indomitable courage. That the poisonous climate created by this situation haunts even those who are responsible for it is apparent from the following statement made on July 4, 1953, by Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister: administrative proceedings, the use The far too-large number of policeof police methods on a large scale, (he excesses committed en masse in (he fields of produce collection, were (he fields which offended the sense of justice of the population, undermined the faith in the rule of law and loosened the links between the people and the state organs. The incredibly brutal and heartless attitude with which the affairs of citizens were dealt by bureucratic officials can justly be taken exception to. They embittered the people. II. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, TIIE GOVERNMENT, AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE PEOPLE By themselves the Hungarian Communists were not so numerous that they could have seized control in Hungary unaided by support from the Soviet Army and by the employment of illegal methods to enhance the strength of their own position. As early as February 22, 1945, Mátyás Rákosi, Hungary’s leading Communist. acknowledged in his first speech after returning from Moscow that the membership of the Hungarian Communist Party was embarrassingly small notwithstanding the presence of the Red army. Forthwith, the leaders of the party set out upon a course to correct this situation principally by broadening the base of power through use of the device known as the United People’s Front. At least on the surface, the Hungarian Communists, consenting to a parliamentary election, seemingly accepted the principles of parliamentarianism and majority rule. Elections wei-e held in November 1945 and 4,700,000 votes were cast. Of this total, 65.5 percent went to non- Marxist parties, including 2,700,000, or 57 percent of the total, which were received by the Smallholders’ Party only 17 percent or 800,000 votes went to the Communists In the western districts of Hungary bordering Austria and Yugoslavia, the anti-Commimist votes were especially heavy, reaching- more than 90 percent. As a consequence of their defeat at the polls, the Communists held only 70 seats in Parliament as against the majority of 245 seats T-»\r bVio .Q rn « 11 ova ’ "PavLxr The decisive majority of the Smallholders’ Party was reduced anu paralyzed by the imprisonment and expulsion of its leaders. A new parliamentary election was announced to take place on August 31, 1947. To replace the Smallholders’ Party, four new parties emerged. Advocating even more vigorous anti-Communist programs, these parties, under the leadership of Zoltán Pfeiffer, István Barankovics, and others succeeded in receiving almost as many votes as the original Smallholders’ Party. In his comment on the 1947 elections Rákosi was compelled to admit the strength of the anti-Communist forces when lie said: The Pfeiffer party succeeded in getting 600,000 votes during a 2- to 3-week campaign, almost without an organization or press. This shows the strength of Fascist reaction in Hungary’s capital. The sudden increase of the Barankovics party is also a warning to us that strong forces exist in our country which do not understand democracy (that is to say, communism) and oppose it. Not disposed to recognize and ae cept any opposition, the Communists proceeded now with complete disregard of the popular vote to assert their control over Hungary’s political and constitutional machinery. Both the Hungarian Independence Party led by Pfeiffer, and the Democratic People’s Party led by Barankovics were dissolved. Because of a bold denunciation of the Soviet occupation forces, the representative of the Christian Women’s League was no longer permitted to attend sessions of Parliament. Next, the Communists directed their attack on the Social Democratic Labor Party with the result that a “rump” congress of the party proclaimed in June 1948 its “friendly” merger with the Communist Party under the new name, the Hungarian Workers’ Party. Records of this last Social Democratic Congress clearly demonstrate how a handful of Communists, aided by the Soviet Red army, could destroy within a matter of days an organization founded over half century ago. And not long after this illegal merger was forcefully imposed, the Social Demo' cratio leaders, with few exceptions, were purged by the Communists. Antál Bán, Minister of Industry, died in exile in a Zurich hospital- István Riesz, Minister of Justice, was imprisoned, later to be killed by the Communists; and György Marosán, along with other leaders, was deported. SPLIT IN COMMUNIST PARTY Yet the Communist Party of Hungary, after its merger with the Social Democrats, itself suffered a sulit in its ranks from the highest echelons clear to the base of the entire party structure. Illustrative of the depth of the cleavage within the pax-ty was the purg-e or execution of three successive Ministers of the Interior: László Rajk, János Kádár, and Sándor Zöld, all leading members. Rajk, Minister of Interior from March 1946 to August 1948 and later Minister of Foreign Affairs from August 1948 to June 1949, was a fanatical young Communist who in his active postwaxcareer had dii-ected the trial of the “conspirators,” incited antireligious agitation effected the removal of the Right Wing Social Democrats, and played a role of major importance in effecting the merger of the Social Democrats with the Communist Party. Charged with being a Titoist, Rajit v/as arrested and on September 24, 1949, was sentenced to death by the Í People’s Court. At the same time, Tibor Szőnyi, chief of the Communist Party’s important cadre division, received the same sentence and was executed as a “western spy.” A few days later, Genex-al György Pálffy- Ocsteri-eicher, Communist Chief of the Military-Political Department in the Ministry of National Defense and commander in chief of the armed forces, was couxt-martialed and sentenced to death. So deep was this cleavage in the Communist. Party apparatus that Rákosi was forced to admit that 7190,470 members of the Communist Pai-ty were expelled (in 1949) and 125,672 members were demoted to the status of a candidate.” Solidarity was hardly a political characteristic of the Hungarian Communist Party in 1949. Measures to countex-act the -centri • fug-al foi-ces of disharmony and to establish unity within the party have failed. Within the higher echelons as well as within the basic units such as the local and factory organizations, the so-called “internal enemy” has continued his subvei-sive work. Thus, as a soiu'ce of tension, the sti-esses and strain within the Communist) Party of Hungary are factors of the greatest significance in evaluating the total pietui-e of Hungary under Soviet domination and as such can neither be overlooked nor ignoi-ed. TO BE CONTINUED YOUR HEALTH You can love a lovebii-d to death. And the death could be your own. Lovebirds, parrots, parakeets and pigeons, the psittacine or book-bi1- led birds, are subject to a virus disease which may be transmitted to humans. Known as psittacosis, the disease follows in a week or two after exposure to an infected bird The symptoms appear fixst as a chest cold, followed by pulmonary disorder similar to pneumonia with high fever. Psittacosis is now xesponding to the new antibiotics. The disease is extremely communicable. During research some years ago at the National Institute of Health, eleven laboratory workers became infected with psittacosis and four died, although some of them had not been near infected birds themselves. Young psittacine birds are more likely to show symptoms when infected than old birds. They may have ruffled feathers, act droopy, and appear chilled. Unfoi-tunately, birds that appear healthy also may be cai-riei-s of the vii-us. SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED TERROR DESTRUCTION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF POWER „ crowded prisons and concentration camps. The Hungarian people possessing no common bonds of language, religion, and historical experience with Russia, can point to a proud tradition of independent, creätive accomplishment. It is evident that they regard attempts at Russification as an affront to their national dignity. Because of the impossibility of open criticism or organized opposition thev are at present forced to submit to such visitations as that of a Soviet bricklayer who comes to show Hungarians how to lay bricks more quickly, or of Soviet scholars and artists who lecture Hungarians about the supremacy of Soviet culture, science, and arts. Yet there is weighty evidence indicating that the answer to such a presumptuous tutelage is a virile nationalism grounded in the loyalty of the bulk of the population to the western heritage. with “acts inimical to the Soviet armed forces.” Legal obstacles to the Communist ascendancy to complete power were ruthlessly cast aside. Scores of Members of Parliament were placed under police surveillance, imprisoned, or deported. T Q 1 ßl' /V V 7 A (It A * "D-x > • , , I , i v, 4- -f 4-L . . Republic, Zoltán Tildy (February 1946 — July 1948) and the second President, the former Social Democrat Árpád Szakasits (August 1948 — April' 195G) who had brought about the destruction of his party by selling out to the Communists, were According to normal parliamentary procedure the Smallholders’ Party had every right to form the Government, placing in the opposition the minority party, the Communists. Such were the proceedings in postwar France, Italy, and Finland. Jn Hungary, however, where the Communist Party was supported by Soviet occupation troops, this fundamental device of orderly parlimentary government was perverted to serve Communist objectives. Notwithstanding their failure to acquire a majority of votes, the Communists demanded the posts of the Vice Presidency and the Ministry of the Interior. Of particular strategic importance was, of course, the Ministry of the Interior, an office which had complete control ovfr the nation's police force. »Organised along the lines of the Soviet-type state security police and staffed with fanatical party members, the police force was an instrument of primary importance in Conjmunist seizure of power. In captive postwar Hungary there was no ‘ recourse to recognized legal procedures or parliamentary practices known in democratic nations of the West. Parliamentary immunity was contemptuously brushed aside, as in the (case of Béla Kovács, the secretary /general of the Smallholders’ Party, who was arrested by Soviet military authorities and who is still missing. Without provocation the Soviet Army intervened and imprisoned deputies, charging them
