The Eighth Tribe, 1978 (5. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1978-01-01 / 1. szám
Page 6 THE EIGHTH TRIBE January, 1978 was ready to have himself crowned a Christian king. Through this act he was hoping to gain for himself and for his nation an admission into the ranks of the legitimate rulers and nations of the European Christian Commonwealth. Becoming a Christian king for one of the recently converted non- Christian rulers of East Central or Eastern Europe was not an easy matter, and it entailed a number of privileges and obligations. Thus, according to medieval European political traditions, a Christian king of that period was at once a “ruler” and a “priest,” who united in his person the dual role of the “Defender of Christianity” (defenser christianitatis) and the “Vicar of Christ” (vicarius Christi). As such, the gaining of the title “Christian King” was much more than the simple recognition of a ruler’s and his nation’s political independence. It also implied a God-given obligation to carry the ideals of Christianity to triumph among the people under his control. And King Stephen, who was fully devoted to these ideals, and who recognized the political and cultural advantages of such a move, meant to do just that. His goal was the Christianization and the Europeanization of the Magyars — through persuasion, if possible, or through coercion, if must be. The year of decision for Stephen was 1000 A.D., the final year of the first millennium of the Christian period. It was in the fall of that year that he dispatched Abbot Astrik (Ascherik, Anastasius) to Rome — at that time the seat of Pope Sylvester II and of Holy Roman Emperor Otto III — to seek the royal title and to ask for a crown. Abbot Astrik’s mission was fully successful, for — as recorded by the chronicler Thietmar of Merseburg — “through the graces and urging of the said emperor (Otto III), the brother-in-law of Prince Henry of Bavaria, Vajk (Stephen), who had established bishoprics in his country, received the crown and the blessing.” Past Hungarian historians have generally emphasized that Stephen had received the crown from the pope, not from the emperor, and thereby he shrewdly avoided both feudal dependence on the emperor, as well as Hungary’s incorporation into the Holy Roman Empire. The fact of the matter, however, is that in the age of Emperor Otto III and Pope Sylvester II (who himself gained the papal office because of Otto’s support) “the religious and secular powers (in Europe) were so intertwined that the pope of his own will, through the granting of a crown, could not have endowed anyone with royal dignity without (the approval of) the emperor.” (Bogyay: Stephanus, 22). But this was also true vice-versa. Thus, in Stephen’s case, it was precisely the full agreement of the pope and the emperor that made it possible for 76 rule. This healthy “national orientation” seems to gain more and more recognition in present-day Hungary, and for this reason the spokesmen of the earlier antinational orientation, characterized by “personality cult” and political terror, are now everywhere on the retreat. This new “nationaT’ and “liberal” orientation is welcomed and applauded by every decent human being and every true Hungarian. But while welcoming this change, we must also point out one of the great flaws of this new orientation: The timidity of the Hungarian Government and of its official representatives in the Western capitals in dealing with the question of the continued oppression of the Hungarian minorities across their borders. As an example, we know for fact thai members of the Hungarian diplomatic corps in Washington, D.C. and in New York are reluctant to talk about the plight of their brethren in Roumania (Transylvania) and Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) . But what is even worse, we are also aware that in many instances when this question is raised, Hungarian diplomats simply withdraw as if fearful to talk about it. This attitude of the official representatives of Hungary is incomprehensible to us, and it is also very harmful for the cause. It is incomprehensible, because in connection with Ceausescu’s Roumania, where the policy of oppression is most extensive, Soviet and Hungarian interests seem to coincide, at least partially; and Hungarian diplomats could inform American and other Western governments about the plight of Hungarian minorities without going through regular diplomatic channels, and thus without endangering East Europe’s “unity,” that is so highly regarded by the Soviets. Moreover, this attitude of the Hungarian diplomats is also harmful. It is detrimental to Hungarian interests because, from the vantage point of the American Government, it is not enough if the plight of the Hungarian minorities is voiced only by the Hungarians in the Western World. For the sake of full creditability, this information must come from at least another source: From the Hungarian minorities themselves, or from the Hungarian Government. Anyone who is familiar with the terroristic oppression of the Hungarian minorities in Roumania, and to a lesser degree in Slovakia, knows that these minorities are unable to speak up without grave and even fateful consequences to themselves.
