Szittyakürt, 1981 (20. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1981-12-01 / 12. szám
OCTOBER 1981 fIGHTE* Page 3 AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 By KLÁRA ENIKŐ ÁCS Virginia Commonwealth University RALPH WALDO EMERSON to LAJOS KOSSUTH at Concord, in 1852: "For this new crusade which you preach to willing and unwilling ears in America is a seed of armed men. You have got your story told in every palace, and log hut, and prairie camp, throughout this continent. And, as the shores of Europe and America approach every month, and their politics will one day mingle, when the crisis arrives, it will find us all instructed beforehand in the rights and wrongs of Hungary, and parties already to her freedom.” ROBERT CATER (1819-1879), editor: KOS SUTH IN NEW ENGLAND. Boston and Cleveland: Jewett, Proctor, and Worthington, 1852, p. 224. The Hungarian events of October-November 1956 cannot be separated from developments outside that country. Any honest appraisal must acknowledge and evaluate the impact of the then intense Cold War. “A studious approach to the Hungarian struggles cannot ignore the interaction between the political evolution of the Soviet Union and that of Hungary, nor can it by-pass other foreign factors, such as Titoism and the Suez episode.”1 The American reaction must also be viewed within the framework of these variables, but specifically in the terms of the foreign policy of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Also to be considered is the seldom understood role of Radio Free Europe. John Foster Dulles was an active proponent of the policy of “Liberation.” On January 27, 1953, well before the Hungarian uprising, he pledged over radio-TV to the “captive” people behind the Iron Curtain that “you can count on us. ”2 Throughout this period the official policy remained that of liberation—however, carefully avoiding involvement when actual unrest behind the Iron Curtain turned into active revolt. The classic example became the Hungarian Revolution. The latter was only one outward sign of the general unrest that existed throughout the satellite area, and any Eastern or Western move regarding Hungary necessarily affected all other parts of that area. “This tragic situation of the Soviet Union and World Communism might have been exploited for the benefit of the free world; the liberation of the satellite area—to which the United States was allegedly committed—would have been a deadly blow inflicted on the Communist camp.”3 The U.S. didn’t recognize the priority which should have been accorded to the Hungarian Revolution. As Professor Váli sees it, a “wait and see” policy was followed instead that misjudged the situation totally. In light of the divisiveness within the Soviet Praesidium any positive action of the West would have been apt to exploit it. Instead, the Western powers showed a notable lack of interest. The pertinent fact here is that the Suez affair exercised a significant, if not decisive, influence over the events in Hungary. For one thing, it rendered a united front against the Soviet impossible; secondly, the simultaneous Suez crisis detracted time and attention from the Hungarian developments; and thirdly, the attack against Egypt provided the Soviets with an admirable distriction. In a sense it accorded them the opportunity for the ruthless suppression of the rebellion. The latter has served as a focal point of debate in the unsuing years: “Shortly after the revolt in Budapest, Hugh Gaitskell raised the question in the House of Commons whether the Russians had been emboldened to intervene because of the news of Eden’s action at Suez. The question, even if Gaitskell intended it only to press a political advantage, was not an unfair one. It would be important to know if this were so. Is there an answer?”4 Directing himself to this question and to another: “If the Russians had moved into Hungary with no Suez problem preoccupying all Western Europe, would the reaction of the West have been more intense?” President Eisenhower reflects, “To both of these questions my own answer has always been negative.”5 In light of this, the question still remains as to the actual response of the United States and why it was such. Attention must be focused again on American foreign policy of the period. Eisenhower and Dulles both rejected containment as not enough—“the United States should aim at restoration of the liberties of oppressed peoples.”6 However, American policy of promoting liberation of captive nations always stopped short of war, and this was well known. “One may say that they seem to induce East Europeans to take action that would provoke Russian reprisals without necessarily loosening the Russian grip of the area...”7 It has become evident in the Hungarian experience that the “attempt to substitute pronouncements or moralistic preachments for policy is bound to end in disaster.”8 Secretary Dulles’ “legalistic and moralistic” approach to foreign policy has often been criticized by those believing that there has resulted an unjustified hiatus between pronouncement and policy. “...by the time of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, when men and boys with bare hands drove the Russians temporarily from Hungary, destroying their tanks with Molotov cocktails, Dulles offered no effective aid, except for platitudes, to the people of Hungary fighting to restore their independence as a Christian nation. In answer to a question, indeed, Dulles stated: “There was no basis for giving aid to Hungary. We had no commitment to do so and we did not think that to do so would either assist the people of Hungary or the people of Europe or the rest of the world. ”9 Perhaps the point can best be made by examining Dulles’ warning to Ho Chi Minh in the advent of a communist invasion of South Vietnam shortly after the Hungarian revolt. He “instruced his Ambassador in Moscow to tell Khrushchev that if South Vietnam was invaded, we would encourage another country in Eastern Europe to revolt.”10 Analyzing the situation more broadly, it must be viewed specifically within the context of the cold war. By 1956 certain ground rules had been evolved and accepted by both sides. Of prime importance was the fact that “once a given area had passed into the opposing spehere of influence and control, the other side could not risk military interference in an effort to regain it.”11 An inquiry called by President Eisenhower in the wake of the Hungarian revolt made the same conclusion: “...there was literally nothing the U.S. could do to help a behind-the-curtain revolt.”12This policy is well understood by both sides as is evidenced by Brezhnev’s comment in relation to the Czech invasion of 1968: “Don’t let us fool ourselves. The biggest Western power understands our vital security interests and accepts them. That’s all that matters.”13 It didn’t take long for the Hungarians to sense this mutual understanding: “...we all had the feeling that from then on there existed a hidden Russo-American pact against war, an agreement probably more binding than any other alliance....”14 In addition to the already intermingled forces operating there is yet another important aspect not to be neglected—the role of Radio Free Europe. Charges of American complicity in the rebellion were based chiefly on broadcasts from Radio Free Europe. The latter claims to be a private non-profit, non-government network broadcasting through the Iron Curtain to eighty million captive people in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. They hold that their basic aim is “to help captive peoples in their struggle to regain their national freedom and personal liberties... persistently the listeners are reminded of their power of inherent KLÁRA ENIKŐ ÁCS, Magna Cum Laude. — B.A. (Kent State University), M.A. (Case Western Reserve University) — Member of the ‘National Political Science Honor Society’, Pi. Sigma. Alpha. — She is presently working for her second advanced degree at the Virginia Commonwealth University. strength... they are also continuously informed of the strength of America and other free nations’.’15 It must be pointed out that RFE is distinct from the Voice of America—operated by the United States Information Agency. The latter represented the propaganda arm of U.S. foreign policy which was extensively used in Hungary. How could it be conceived, therefore, that the U.S. would allow a competing organization to broadcast as it pleased—possibly inciting revolt or even involving the United States in military action? The answer obviously is that it didn’t. While RFE fervently claims no government funding, its budget figures are not published anywhere. Actually, it is now public knowledge—as admitted by President Nixon himself—that RFE is indeed funded almost entirely by the CIA. If anything, this makes the responsibility of the U.S. that much greater in the issuing of encouraging to the people of Hungary. The attitude of the Hungarian people themselves toward foreign broadcasting was perhaps best summed up by the student... who said: “it was our only hope, and we tried to console ourselves with it.”16While none of the inquiries conducted actually produced any evidence that RFE promised military aid, there is no doubt that it encouraged the freedom fighters. As an example of a broadcast, this is a script of November 3 as the Soviet tanks surrounded Budapest: “The Soviet monster stands at our gates... the eight days’ victorious revolution have turned Hungary into a free land... Neither Khrushchev nor the whole of the Soviet army have the power to oppress this new liberty... What can you do against Hungary, you Soviet legions? It is in vain to pierce Hungarian souls with your bayonets. You can destroy and shoot and kill: our freedom will now forevermore defy you__”17 The point in question is are we prepared to assume direct responsibility for these messages? In the absence of “actual” evidence, probably not. The American attitude was one of sympathy, but inaction, “...there was little that Ike felt he could do to save the valiant people who, unfortunately stimulated by American broadcasts, sought to gain control of their nation.”18 Dulles did take the problem to the United Nations, but that body lost face. Hungary, by declaring her neutral status and withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty, was facilitating action by the U.N.— however, to no avail. The Soviet veto was the overriding factor and the U.N. investigators were ignored by Moscow. The General Assembly’s resolution calling for immediate cessation of Soviet intervention in Hungary couldn’t have had less significance. A special report issued by the General Assembly ended by saying: “A massive armed intervention by one power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country must, by the Soviet’s own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern.”19It was a matter of concern, but not one of action. In retrospect, world acceptance of the Russian aggression in Hungary is still incredible. “For sheer perfidy and relentless suppression of a courageous people longing for their liberty, Hungary will always remain a classic symbol.”20At a dramatic moment in history, both the United States and the United Nations lost face. In the end, our government was reduced to the minimal policy of providing assistance to the Hungarian refugees. The question remains: has the response
