Századok – 2015
2015 / 3. szám - MŰHELY - Gyarmati Enikő: 1917 - a júliusi válság régi-új historiográfiai olvasatai az első világháború centenáriumán
1914 - A JÚLIUSI VÁLSÁG RÉGI-ÚJ HISTORIOGRÁFIAI OLVASATAI 753 it. A Habsburg Monarchia mint Európa második „beteg embere” részben saját presztízsének és integritásának megőrzésére koncentrált, részben viszont a kisnémet út közép-európai következményeivel szembesült, amikor 1914 júliusában csak látszólag hozott önálló döntést az ultimátum elküldésével. Ennek az ultimátumnak a megfogalmazásakor Tisza István magyar miniszterelnök a külföldi történészek által is elismert politikai erejének, tekintélyének köszönhetően közel három héten át képes volt racionális feltételeket szabni. A globális, transznacionális történeti diskurzus térhódítása miatt azonban Tisza magyar nemzeti, nemzetállami szempontjai nincsenek jelen a nemzetközi szakirodalomban. Mint ahogy az is kiderült, hogy a Magyar Királyság különérdekeivel éppúgy nem számoltak akkor a meghatározó korabeli európai hatalmak, így a mai nemzetközi történetírásban sem kap számottevő figyelmet a magyar fejlődés. THE NEW-OLD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1914 JULY CRISES ON THE WORLD WAR ONE CENTENARY by Enikő Gyarmati Summary Among many other studies dealing with the history of the First World War while remembering of its Centenary I would like to present four monographies describing the short but rather important period — the July Crises of 1914 — which is considered to be by many historians as the direct pre-war event. Annika Mombauer’s booklet The July Crises was published by the German Publisher C.H. Beck in 2014. The author’s short, essence focused approach which concentrates on the possibilities of avoiding this war represents a real value for this work. Gerd Krumeich’s monography — Juli 1914. A Balance - was also published in the same year. It includes fifty original documents of that period of time that may well be considered as a rich contribution to this topic. Sean Meekin’s elaboration July 1914 offers a good example of how one can bring the history closer to today’s readers. He presents the responsible decision makers — both the high-ranking politicians and soldiers as well — as virtuous or weak persons with given physical and mental talents together with their certainties or uncertainties which all influenced their decision making process besides their political convictions. Cristopher Clark intended to demonstrate in his lengthy adaptation of the July Crisis the complexity of the international political system. The Sleepwalkers — an ambitious book published in 2012 — interpretes the Sarajevo assassination as a transforming factor in this process to war. In my essay I was primarily trying to tackle the historical consensuses, highlighting the disputed questions as well as to present the conceptions yet open to debate . I decided to follow a thematically and not a chronologically structured scheme dedicating one chapter to each participating country in order to present some historical views. Though the basic questions of the international historical research dealing with the Grande War remained unchanged, the Centenary motivated some new interpretations and evaluations of this event. The latest researches made it obvious that the decisions of the conscious and irresponsible political and military decision makers initiated the First World War against the determination of many others. In some respect contrary to or parallel with Clark’s brilliant metapher of the Sleepwalkers the European powers and decision makers were at the same time active participants in a sequent of events — starting with the Russian-Japanese conflict, through the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Agadir Conflict, followed by the two Balkan Wars. These accumulated masses of conflict were finally not anymore manageable with peaceful diplomatic means in July 1914.
