Századok – 2005

TANULMÁNYOK - Kovács Gábor: Szombathelyi Ferenc és a "Balkáni megszálló hadosztályok ügye 1943-ban 1371

SZOMBATHELYI FERENC - 1943-BAN 1425 According to the most common historical interpretation Szombathelyi fell victim to the balancing foreign policy of prime minister Miklós Kállay. Thus, in early February, when Szombathelyi visited the German headquarters, he could still believe that an eventual Hungarian participation in a Balkan offensive would be in keeping with Kállay's political conception. For during the session of the foreign policy committee of the Parliament on 19 February Kállay referred to his relationship with Dra a Mihailovic, minister of defense of the Yugoslav emigrant government. Consequently, Szombathelyi only consented to the sending of troops to the Balkans with this relationship in mind, and was informed too late about its end. The author, hovewer, argues that it was behind the back of the Hungarian government that Szombathelyi negotiated about the Balkan occupation with the Germans, and that it was not the relationship with Mihailovic but the one with the Nedic government that Kállay referred to in the foreign policy committee. The author comes to a similar conclusion with regard to the role of Szombathelyi concerning the second German demand in August. The aim of the chief of staff in these cases was to act independently of the government and gain the support of governor Miklós Horthy; this was facilitated for him by his right to report immediately to the governor as to the supreme military leader. For Szombathely the military considerations came first, and not in keeping but against the policy pursued by Kállay and his groop. Thus, although sometimes protesting himself against the political role of the military, his own actions also shifted to the political sphere. From a Hungarian point of view the Balkan problem was linked to the suppression of the eastern front. The ending of the war against the Soviet Union was constantly demanded by the Anglo-Saxon powers as well. Moreover, the chief of staff thought that in the case of an Anglo-Saxon landing in the Balkans the Hungarian divisions there could go over to the invaders. It was in this sense that Kállay tested the Americans in August, but the idea was rejected. Consequently, Kállay aimed at gradually abandoning the war altogether, whereas Szombathelyi, learning from the lessons of World War I, urged for continuing the war and sending troops to the Balkans. The attitude of the chief of staff was basically determined by three considerations: 1. To avoid the possible retorsions — among them an eventual occupation of Hungary — following a rejection of the German demand; 2. Maintaining the occupation and fighting spirit of the army, presupposing and also resulting in further military experience and German equipment; 3. Since the Anglo-Saxons cannot be counted I upon, the only dam against the greatest danger, that is, the Soviet Union, can only be Germany. I f