Századok – 2000

TANULMÁNYOK - Baráth Magdolna: Pártközi kapcsolatok (MKP-SZK(b)P 1943-1947 1335

PÁRTKÖZI KAPCSOLATOK (MKP-SZK(b)P) 1943-1947 1359 du parti hongrois peut être liée à cette période. Ces critiques furent mises au jour non seulement sur les affaires hongroises, une série des documents fut formulée au printemps de 1948 par le Bureau des Affaires Étrangères du PCUS, dont le point commun était qu'il était nécessaire de démasquer les fautes anti-marxistes commises à l'intérieure des parties communistes. Dans cette situation nouvelle ces critiques avait le caractère d'actes d'accusation tandis qu'avant la direction soviétique n'attribuait pas de grande importance aux objéctions répétées du routin, portant sur la „déviation nationaliste" des partis. La direction soviétique supporta, même soutint jusqu'en 1Ö47 la présence des routes nationales différentes du dévéloppement du socialisme. Déjà à l'assemblée du Bureau d'Information on commenait à reviser, et, parallèlement à cela on se mettait dès 1947 à unifier les différents courants présents à l'intérieur des parties, aunsi qu'à purifier de la direction des partis. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST (BOLSHEVIK) PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (1943-1947) by Magdolna Barátli (Summary) The paper analyses the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian communist in the period between the dissolution of the Comintern and the establishment of the Bureau of Information on the basis of hitherto unknown documents from Russian and Hungarian archives. Although the new institutional network of communication with the other communist parties began to be formed immediately after the dissolution of the Comintern, it remained somewhat rudimentary even after the return of the Hungarian communist emigrees from the Soviet Union. During the war it was the so-called Foreign Committee, headed by Mátyás Rákosi, which maintained relations with Dimitrov and transmitted the informations and wishes of the communists working in or near the front to the Soviet communist leaders. After the return of the Hungarian communists to Hungary the Soviet leaders were informed about the activities of the Hungarian Communist Party and the internal situation of the country in a number of ways: through the Party itself and its representative in Moscow, through the mission of the Allied Forces in Hungary and - the political bureau of the Red Army. Later on wireless connection was also established between the two parties, and a direct telephone connection functioned from the late 1940s. The analysis of the available sources has clearly proved the essentially one-way character of this relationship. The Soviet leaders could form their opinion on the policies of the Hungarian Communist Party on the basis of information sent by the Hungarian communists and the minutes of the sessions of the most important decision-making bodies, but transferred no comments to their 1 Hungarian fellow-communists: critical remarks only reached Rákosi and the other Hungarian leaders through indirect ways. It seems that whereas the Soviets regarded the Hungarian communists ' before all as a trustworthy source of information on the internal situation in Hungary, Rákosi and the other leading Hungarian communists tried to profit from their relations with the Soviet leaders in order to realize their goals in Hungarian domestic politics. The most frequently repeated demand in the letters of the Hungarian leaders urged the Soviets to let home the Hungarian emigrees who were still working in Soviet factories and offices and were badly needed by a Hungarian party in need of experienced cadres. Rákosi and his fellow-leaders also frequently turned to Dimitrov and Stalin with the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, but the Soviets remained unwilling to mediate in the conflict until 1947. The relative independence of the communist parties in the post-war period was ended by the establishment of the Bureau of Information in the autumn of 1947. The Cominform was one of the elements of the Soviet conception which aimed at the creation of a (politically, economically and ideologically) homogeneous and firmly controlled group in the face of Western menaces in the milieu of the Cold War. In this context the divergent opinions concerning the Marshall plan and the tensions between the national communist parties (especially between those of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) appeared to the Soviet leaders as potentially dangerous cleavages. The change in the Soviet foreign policy and the declaration of the ideology of the two camps manifested themselves in the inter-party relations and led back to the centralizing policy of the pre-war period. It was at that time that traces of a more serious criticism concerning the activity of the Hungarian Communist Party appeared in the reports prepared by the Foreign Department of the Soviet Communist Party. Yet this critical