Századok – 1998

Tanulmányok - Hermann Róbert: A Drávától Schwechatig. Az 1848 őszi hadiesemények a Dunántúlon és a Felvidéken. 1848 szeptember – november. Jellacic horvátországi csapatainak támadásától Simunich kiszorításáig II/327

370 HERMANN ROBERT d'Eszék, de Komárom et de Lipótvár. Le fait que tous les forteresses à l'ouest du cours du Danube furent acquises par les troupes hongrois, contribua beaucoup à l'échouage de Jellaèiœ - précise l'auteur. Elle démontre l'histoire des campagnes hongroises lancées pour libérer la ville de Vienne ainsi que les cause de leur chute. Dans ce contexte il formule que le combat de Schwechat aurait pu provoquer la chute catastrophique de l'armée principale hongroise. Un chapitre intégral fut consacré à la campagne de Muraköz et de Mura de Mór Perczel. En somme, résume l'étude, l'armée hongroise eut un rendement supérieur à celui des troupes croates de Jellaèiœ ou de l'armée royale et impériale de Windisch-Grätz. Les défauts de tactique de l'armée hongroise ne permettèrent pas de faire valoir tous les avantages stratégiques, cette armée impromptue eut pourtant des victoires tactiques très remarquables en automne 1848. FROM THE RIVER DRAVE TO SCHWECHAT. Military Operations in Transdanubia and Upper Hungary, September to November, 1848, i.e., from the Attack of the Croatian Troops Led by Jelai to Simunich's Retreat by Robert Hermann (Summary) The article analyzes the first phase of the military history of the Hungarian war of independence based on Hungarian and Viennese archival sources and historical writings from both countries. The changing relationship of Croatia and Hungary is introduced together with the attempts at creating peace, and the preparations for war in the spring and autumn of 1848 on both sides of the borde.. The antecendents of the Croatian attack and Jelai's operational plans are discussed in detail. The author maintains that from strategic point of view the Croatian attack was doomed to failure as early as the middle of September. From that time on the emperor alone could have turned the course of events with an open intervention in favour of Jelai. The battle at Pákozd on September 29, 1848 is not seen by the author as an important one from military point of view. Nevertheless it was the sign of the collapse of the Croatian stratagem. Also the uncertainties about the armistice are described together with the motives of Jelai in its conclusion. The article describes in detail how Jelai's army was ousted from the country, how Southern Hungary was liberated, and how the fortresses at Eszék, Komárom, and Lipótvár were secured again. The author establishes that the failure of Jelai was basically due to the fact that all fortresses west of the Danube had been recaptured by the Hungarians. The Hungarian campaigns to liberate Vienna and the causes of their failure are also described in detail. The author thinks that the battle at Schwechat could easily have ended with the total collapse of the main body of the Hungarian army. A separate chapter deals with the campaigns of Mór Perczel in Medjumuije and along the River Mura. To sum up, the achievement of the Hungarian army in the operations of late 1848 seems to have been much better than that of either the Croatian army of Jelai or the Austrian army of Windisch-Grätz. Although the Hungarians' tactical weaknesses did not make it possible for them to make better use of all their strategic advantages, it was this makeshift military force that scored significant military successes in the autumn of 1848.