Századok – 1994
Tanulmányok - Diószegi István: Bismarck és Andrássy 1870–1871-ben III–IV/517
BISMARCK ÉS ANDRÁSSY 1870-1871-BEN 577 227 Bose an Friesen. Wien, den 6. Januar 1871. Sachs. Landeshauptarchiv Dresden. Aussenministerium 1034. 228 V.ö. 226. jegyzet. 229 V.ö. 224. jegyzet. 230 Hiügruber: Bismarcks Außenpolitik 117. old. 231 Bismarck Die gesammelten Werke 6b k. 667. old. 232 Hiügruber: Bismarcks Außenpolitik 125-126. old. 233 Bose an Friesen. Wien, den 16. März 1871. Sächs. Landeshauptarchiv Dresden. Aussenministerium No 1441* 234 Schweinitz an Bismarck. Wien, den 16. März 1871. PA Bonn. I. A. A. 1 (Österreich) 41. Bd. 15. 235 Schweinitz: Denkwürdigkeiten I. k. 287-288. old. 236 Könneritz an Friesen. Berlin, den 10. März 1871. Sächs. Landeshauptarchiv Dresden. Aussenministerium 14414 BISMARCK AND ANDRÁSSY IN 1870/1871 by Diószegi István (Summary) The article analyses the relationship of the two statesmen at he time of the Franco-Prussian war and places their statements against a wider background of foreign and domestic policy, offering by this an overview of German and Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in working. Besides the already published sources and treatments of the problem, the author has also made use of documents found in the Vienna, Bonn, Moscow, Paris and Dresden archives on foreign affairs. When the war broke out, Andrássy represented the view of the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and presuming the victory of the French, he adopted passive neutrality, counting at the same time on a war against the Russians, Bismarck was disappointed at this stand, since he had considered the leaders of Hungarian political life with Andrássy among them, potential allies of Germany. After the victory of the German army at Sedan. Andrássy changed his views and accepted both the prospective annexations by Germany and the possibility of the Southern German states' joining the North-German Federation. Bismarck remained, however, mistrustful of Austria-Hungary, and wished to discredit and ruin the joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beust. He had reservations also towards Andrássy and did not want him to take the place of Beust. In the wake of the 1870 note of Gorchakow, Andrássy urged for definite anti-Russian measures for which he wished to win the North-German Federation. Although Bismarck was not fully for the Russian measure, he wished to solve the crisis in diplomatic channels and turned a deaf ear to Andrássy's proposal. In the last phase of the war Bismarck found if necessary to make up with the Dual Monarchy. His rapprochement was welcome in Vienna this time. Af the same time the Germans noted for Beust, since Bismarck found it possible to cooperate with the Monarchy only on the basis of close German-Russian relations and definitely rejected the anti-Russian views of Andrássy. István Diószegi BISMARCK ET ANDRÁSSY EN 1870-1871 (Résumé) Létude présente la relation des deux hommes d'État dans l'époque de la guerre franco-prussienne. L'auteur dépose leurs manifestations dans un contexte plus large de la politique extérieure et intérieure donnant par Г une vue globale de la formation de la politique extérieure allemande et austro-hongroise. Létude se fonde — hors des rapports et sources publiés — sur les recherches de l'auteur faites dans les archives des affaires étrangères de Vienne, de Bonne, de Moscou, de Paris et de Dresde. Après l'explosion de la guerre: Andrássy — en accord avec la direction de la politique extérieure austro-hongorise —, supposant une victoire française, représentait une attitude de neutralité expectante et calculait avec la possibilité d'une guerre antirusse. Son attitude avait déçu Bismarck car il estimait la direction politique hongroise et personnellement Andrássy comme des alliés potentiels de l'Allemagne. Suivant la victoire de l'armée allemande à Sedan: Andrássy modifiait sa position et acceptait et les
