Századok – 1937

Pótfüzet - HEGEDÜS LORÁNT: Lord Beaconsfield politikai ügynökének jelentései gróf Andrássy Gyula és Tisza Kálmán politikájáról a keleti válság idejében 576–616

608 HEGEDŰS LÓRÁNT, [98] well prepared to defend his Foreign Policy; but he was completely taken aback at the discovery that a majority of the Finance Committee would declare that they were not competent to discuss the Government proposals. Yet the argument is simple enough, as stated by Dr. Herbst, and might have been foreseen. The Delegation is, as its name implies, a Body selected from and by the Legislature to represent it for certain specific purposes; but it cannot arrogate to itself an authority not involved in the mandate it receives. Dr. Herbst argues that he and his Colleagues are not competent to vote a credit for the execution of a policy initiated by the Treaty of Berlin, upon which Treaty the Legislature from which they received their mandates has not yet had the opportunity, guaranteed to it as a Constitutional privilege, to pronounce. The Delegation might agree to vote the expenditure incurred, but it has not itself the power to supply the funds, nor even to decide in what way they should be raised. And what would happen if the Legislature, taking its stand upon its undoubted Constitutional Right to pronounce upon a Treaty, the stipulations of which involve a large pecuniary outlay, should refuse to take measures to provide the funds? The Delegation and the Legislature from which it derives its powers would be brought into conflict, and a grave constitutional danger would be the result. To a foreigner who has had considerable opportunity of studying the working of the machinery, this argument appears eminently to prove the inherent weakness of the complicated Dual System. Probably Count Andrassy himself felt this; for a careful analysis of Iiis reply to Dr. Herbst must, I think, impress the reader with its weakness and insufficiency. Such at least was the effect produced upon my own mind upon a first perusal of his speech, and such it now remains. He is forced to admit the legality of Dr. Herbst's contention as to the claim of the Reichsrath to have the Treaty submitted to it; and it is therefore difficult to understand why he did not take care that that Body should at, any rate have had ample time to discuss its provisions. By not doing so, he leaves it to be inferred that he feared the judgment of Parliament upon his Foreign Policy, and was anxious to secure, in an indirect way, a vote of indemnity which could not afterwards be impugned. He quibbles over the expression ratification ; but however exclusive and indefeasible may be the prerogative of the Sovereign as regards the ratification of a Treaty, it is clear that under a constitutional Government any Treaty stipulation dependent for its execution upon the adtion of the Legislature in the provision of ways and means, requires something more for its validity than the assent of the Crown. It is idle for Count Andrassy to argue or to imply that the Congress of Berlin forced upon Austria-Hungary the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina ; and to characterise the Congress itself as a European Areopagus or Tribunal, which possessed the power of enforcing its mandates without regard to the constitutional privileges of the Countries concerned. I cannot but think that Count Andrassy made a very unfortunate reference to the "possibility that the Full Powers of a Plenipotentiary might be nullified by the whim of some single Legislature". Such a phrase was not calculated to conciliate his audience, and was ill placed in the mouth of one who has always combatted for constitutional liberty. His reference to the usages of other countries was not more happy. It is certain that in Italy, France and England, a Government would think itself bound to submit without delay to the decision of the Legislature such measures as would be necessary to carry out