Századok – 1937

Pótfüzet - HEGEDÜS LORÁNT: Lord Beaconsfield politikai ügynökének jelentései gróf Andrássy Gyula és Tisza Kálmán politikájáról a keleti válság idejében 576–616

[79] BE ACONSFIELD ÜGYNÖKÉNEK JELENTÉSEI. 611 to any antidynastic tendencies (which however I have never perceived) ; — and even in Montenegro, where Russia has for years expended much money and labour, I have never conversed with any one, from Prince Nicholas downwards, who did not openly avow his anti-Russian prejudices, and deplore the concatenation of circumstances, and the course of an unwise policy, which had resulted in rendering the Principality so dependent upon Russian aid. I have the honour etc. No. 21. Budapesth, May 1, 1878. ( Confidential.) Sir, With reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 15th Ultimo, in which I reported to Your Excellency the formation of the United opposition Party, and explained its general programme, I have now to state that I have recently had opportunities of conversing with many of its principal members, who have communicated to me with extreme frankness the object of their policy and the means by which they hope to arrive at it. Altho' their programme contains many points of domestic importance upon which the new Party oppose Mr. Tisza's Government, the real object of the present movement is to effect a change in the Foreign Policy of the Empire. As Your Excellency well knows, Coimt Andrassy, while still preserving much of his original personal popularity, has alienated the political sympathies of a large number of his old Magyar friends. They are really outraged at his neglect of the vital, or what they believe to be the vital, interests of the Monarchy, and though willing to make allowance for the difficulties of his position have yet no mind that he should compromise the country by any action implying acquiescence in the policy of partition favoured by Russia, and Germany. The strength of Count Andrassy in the Councils of the Empire consists in the fact that he has hitherto been able to reckon upon the persistent support of the Hungarian Government and in spite of the universal feeling that his policy has not really been in harmony with the wishes of the Magyars, the influence exercised by Mr. Tisza has been sufficient to compass the adherence of the Parliamentary majority, and to prevent, as yet, any serious obstacle being raised to the continuance of an uncertainty in the ultimate intentions of the Central Government. The members of the two extreme parties have been numerically too weak to shake Mr. Tisza's position, and the dissidents from Mr. Tisza's own party have held aloof from any action in concert with the Right and Left. The persuasion that the line of conduct pursued by Count Andrassy on the Eastern Question would remain unaltered as long as Mr. Tisza continued to be his sworn henchman, has brought about the Fusion. Mr. Tisza has been content to accept all Count Andrassy's views with blind confidence —- being himself, in the judgment of every one who has approached him, remarkably ill informed with regard to Foreign Politics. He has been content to accept Count Andrassy's assurances that England is not to be trusted; that an English Alliance, even if it could be effected in the teeth of the notorious disinclination of English Statesmen to bind their Country by a formal Convention, would expose Austria-Hungary to all the perils of Russian vindietiveness, without any guarantee that at the moment when England had secured her own interests, she would not suddenly abandon her 39*