Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 2. szám)
Relaţii internaţionale
The Relations of Vassalage 269 sultan was received favourably, at least on principle. On his way back, one of the Polish representatives who intended to inform the Hungarian noblemen on the project, was sent to jail by Pipo Spano138, count of Timiş whose main attributions were to defend the Hungarian southern borders. Thus, the suspicion concerning possible Polish maneouvres hostile to Hungary is explainable if we take into consideration that between May and September 1415 the Hungarian troops were engaged in war against the Bosniacs allied with the Turks139. Mircea was to be implicated in the ensuing Hungarian-Polish diplomatic dispute. He defended himself against the accusations and asked the Polish King to get information directly from the Hungarians whether he was to blame for the rumour140. At this moment, Mircea was on peaceful terms with both Christian powers. While accepting on principle the peace negotiations, Sigismund supported once again a different candidate to the Ottoman throne. Based on Turkish chronicles, historiographers have claimed that Mircea the Old granted his military support to Mustafa, the new pretender to the throne141. It seems that, being directly interested in the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the Hungarian king secretly sustained Mircea's scheming. Thus, according to a note written overleaf a document, in the spring of 1416 a Transylvanian army led by voivode Miklós Csáki was sent to help Mircea142 in his attempt to impose Mustafa as a new sultan. Simultaneously, in March 1416, the Wallachian and Turkish troops loyal to Mustafa were at the Danube, ready to attack143. Hence, Mircea's action was backed by Hungary with military forces as well. Moreover, the Hungarians' interest and implication in the Ottoman internal political intrigues is explained by the fact that they had been at war with the Turks from Bosnia since February144. The military campaign carried in favour of the candidate failed definitively at Salonic at the end of that year. Meanwhile, Mircea’s duplicitous nature was tempted again by the Lithuanian King Vitold's envoy who proposed an alliance against Sigismund145. Just like in the years 1410 and 1411, Mircea was invited to conclude an alliance against the Hungarian king at the very time when he and his suzerain were carrying on important political actions in the Balkans. aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia, tomus VI, Codicem epistolarem Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae 1376-1430, W Krakowie, 1882, no. DCLI, pp. 331-333. 138 Ioannis Dlvgossi sev Longini, Historia Polonica, Francofvrti, 1711, liber vndecimis, coi. 361-362 (1414). 139 Zs. okl. (see note 96), V, nos. 580, 625, 636-637, 894, 994, 1006,1026 etc. 140 Hurmuzaki, Documente (see note 40), 1/2, pp. 825-826. For the date: P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15), p. 328. 141 T. Gentil, Românii şi otomanii (see note 47), pp. 96-98. 142 Zs.okl. (see note 96), V, no. 1711, p. 468. A note on back of a document from the judge's office: „.. .eo, quod Osualdus unacum vayvoda de Chak in subsidium Merche asseritur fore profecturus“. 143 P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15), p. 333. 144 Zs.okl. (see note 96), V, nos. 1573, 1768, 1849, 1976, 2031,2158, 2301 etc. 145 Ibidem, V, nos. 2023, p. 545-546. The Hungarian authorities were informed on the matter. Furthermore, it is possible that the other Romanian-Polish agreements and treaties, though secret, could have been known by the Hungarians.
