Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 2. szám)
Relaţii internaţionale
The Relations of Vassalage 267 aiming at taking over the Land of Făgăraş which was no longer under the Romanian voivode’s authority?! The ambiguous data we have cannot elucidate the evolution of this armed conflict. The Hungarian military intervention was taking place simultaneously with a campaign to the south of the Danube led by Mircea's son or nephew, Dan, who commanded an army consisting of Wallachian soldiers and of Serbian and Turkish partisans of Celebi Műsá125. However, it seems that the Hungarian military intervention was actually aimed at resuming the alliance with Poland. To thwart Sigismund's pressures, Mircea approached once again the Polish king126. The renewal of the act of trade privileges for the merchants from Lwow in 1409 had been a first step127. On February 6th 1410, the king of Poland reconfirmed the old letters and treaties concluded with the Wallachian voivode, mentioning that the initiative was mutual128 129. So, the Hungarian spring campaign of 1410 took place in this particular context. It is likely that the Hungarian king ordered the Transylvanian voivode to bring Mircea back under his authority. For all that, further development of the events attest the failure of the Hungarian attempt. In the following year the old Romanian-Polish military alliance against Sigismund would be confirmed on the basis of new diplomas mentioning clearly expressed clauses. One fragment is particularly relevant as to the tensioned situation; it was written in terms quite different from those used in the previous treaties of 1389-139: "But, in case that the above mentioned King of Hungary rose as enemy against the above-mentioned King Wladislaw etc., then we, as enemies, promise, even more, we take an oath that together with our men, we will stop him at the borders of Hungary by fire or any other means. On the other hand, if the same King of Hungary etc., tried, as an enemy, to subjugate us or our country, then the above mentioned Wladislaw, the King of etc., must and will be obliged to support us by means of his power and the above mentioned courses of action..."'29. These terms had been brought in because of the on-going Hungarian-Polish conflict. This time it was the Polish King who needed mostly support against Sigismund. At the same time, Alexander the Good, Voivode of Moldavia was renewing his homage to the Polish king in more favourable terms than before with 125 See T. Gemil, Românii şi otomanii (see note 47), p. 93, on the campaign to the south of the Danube. 126 P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15), p. 322, claimed that the first steps had been taken by the Polish king! 127 Ibidem, p. 353. 128 Ibidem, p. 354. 129 DRH, D., I, pp. 115-116: „In casu autem, si idem Hungarie rex hostiliter insurgeret, aut sui contra sepefatum dominum Wladizlaum regem etc., extunc, nos, hostiliter, spondemus, ymmo promitimus, nostra cum gente, fines regni Hungarie fortiter constringere, incendio et omne malo. Dum autem, idem rex Hungarie etc., nos aut nostram terram, hostiliter attemptaverit subintrare, extunc prefatus dominus Wladizlaus rex etc., hec omnia super supradicta nobis toto posse atque potencia debeat et teneatur adiuvare“. For comparison see the documents form 1390 and 1391: ibidem, pp. 122-123, 125-126.
