Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
László Öllös: Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue (Conclusion)
Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue are prepared to embrace it? What are the chances of extending their ranks in the time of increasingly closer economic ties, cross-border cooperation, creation of trans-border regions and other bonds? Who are the principal opponents of national reconciliation? Will mutual competition between states not cause their ranks to increase? The rate of liking or disliking of neighbouring nations is quite individual. Equally individual is the rate to which certain individuals encourage and expediently abuse aggressive national sentiments, let alone their methods. It is important to define this rate in both sub-communities because it largely determines the space for future activities of proponents as well as opponents of national reconciliation. Also, all these factors should be examined separately for each country because they obviously differ from one country to another. The Hungarians should also be examined from identical viewpoints. They must answer a legitimate question: Is it truly possible to create an atmosphere of national reconciliation with neighbours who are suspicious as it is when symbols of Hungarian national revanchism regularly appear during rallies and scuffles on the streets of Budapest, at events organized by paramilitary organizations and even at football matches in neighbouring countries? It will certainly not be easy as public manifestation of revanchist symbolism plays into the hands of reconciliation’s opponents who do not wish to eliminate national aggressiveness. The apparition of threat amplified by the media puts advocates of reconciliation into a difficult position. Equally counterproductive is the equivocal rhetoric used by Hungarian and ethnic Hungarian politicians regarding stability of borders in the region. They believe they can get away with ambiguous statements on border stability during talks with western politicians if they interpret particular statements in a desirable way. They view equivocalness as an effective tool to mount pressure on neighbouring countries and win sympathies of domestic radicals at the same time. In fact, this equivocalness has grave consequences as it suits those political leaders in neighbouring countries that also play the card of national threat and are free to use the ambiguities to their own advantage by attaching them any meaning they please. Even worse, these politicians go even further and strive to attribute hidden meaning also to unambiguous statements by Hungarian officials. Last but not least, western political leaders learned a great deal about the politics of ambiguity and double communication in the Yugoslavian war; they are well aware that authors of ambiguous statements resort to interpreting their own words as the situation requires. Still, a fruitful discussion with neighbouring states’ citizens may not necessarily be doomed if only Hungary reached the mentioned constitutio-261
