Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)

László Öllös: Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue (Conclusion)

Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue

cannot make any excuses or blame anybody else. Consequently, it is solely up to people who make up the Hungarian nation whether they strive to reconcile with their neighbours at the beginning of the 2151 century; along the same lines, it is up to the Slovaks whether they decide to establish national reconciliation with the Hungarians. Many players would like to intervene with this decision-making; however, in our period they cannot prevent information on their efforts from reaching both countries’ citizens.

Both countries’ leading political representatives would certainly view such a process with suspicion and would probably try to thwart it. In compliance with their own system of values, some of them would perceive it purely ideologically and would understand it as a propagandistic attack on their own authority just because they themselves maintain influence through propaganda that is a combination of aggressive ideologies. In other words, the project’s failure would benefit or at least suit many. Nevertheless, much is to be achieved. For one, most ordinary people would like to support national reconciliation and they will if they are given an opportunity. For two, government is not the only channel to appeal to the population of a democratic European state; if there is a will, there are many other ways to convey a message to inhabitants of a neighbouring country.

Hungary’s political community including politicians and various interest groups with different value systems may reach a consensus regarding this issue by, for instance, extracting the reconciliation issue from the category of domestic political issues and making it a nationwide objective. Quite frankly, any other strategy would hardly seem viable. It is difficult to imagine a neighbouring country reaching a constitutional consensus over its ethnic Hungarians if Hungary itself is unable to reach such a consensus. In no country do changes in the value system happen overnight. It is obvious that tangible results may only be achieved through relentless endeavour that spans a number of electoral terms. Hopefully, Hungary’s political community along with its leaders may just agree to embark on the said task.

The constitutional consensus over the issue of ethnic Hungarians would not only benefit Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries as it would essentially affect also the national identity of Hungarians living in Hungary. An issue that may not significantly affect everyday existence of average Hungarian citizens but nevertheless forms an important part of their concept of the nation’s future would simply be lifted from the frontline of domestic political battles and elevated among values and objectives that are subscribed to and often publicly presented by political parties as well as government leaders. This would amount to renaissance of the constitutional consensus regarding one of principal issues of the Hungarian nation’s future.

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