Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
László Öllös: Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue (Conclusion)
Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue One of possible outcomes of these efforts is populism, which is a hotchpotch of ideologized value systems amalgamated by utilitarian needs and driven by the overriding concept of gaining and preserving power. To the droves of voters they otherwise despise, populist politicians sell the illusion of participation in political decision-making based on emotional identification. On the first glimpse, it is some kind of hybrid conservatism as the tools used by political leaders feature a much broader scope of political traditions compared to previous periods; on the other hand, the users of these tools do not feel bound by moral principles. The backbone of populism is expedience, i.e. political success. In an ideal condition, it has two principal actors: first, a politician-entrepreneur who views the original ideas as a tool for progress and subscribes to the individualized idea of waging a permanent campaign against everybody; second, a crowd that supports such a politician, manipulated by the bureaucratic machinery that fulfils the role of an ideologist. For old-time politicians who sought their niche in the new social order, aggressive anti-minority nationalism that was amplified in the final stages of communism seemed to be the perfect tool to undermine revolutionaries’ legitimacy and reinvent their own. On their quest, they found close allies among utilitarian upholders of the perished authoritarianism and heirs of fascist traditions. Hungary’s policy of pressure that does not strive to appeal to the Slovak public is absolutely expedient for these politicians; anytime they deem it necessary, they may point out the Hungarian neighbour’s despotic behaviour. As long as the majority of political leaders endorse latently or overtly hostile attitudes with respect to another nation, this status quo cannot be changed even by government rotations conforming to the rules of constitutional democracy. The hostile attitudes cannot be eliminated by ethnic Hungarians’ government participation, both countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration, abolition of custom borders or expanding regionalism. Constitutional value systems of political communities do not develop primarily as the consequence of violence that has befallen them. If it was so, each military conflict or war would put the communities involved to a qualitatively higher level of constitutionality thanks to violence alone. Much more important to development of political communities’ constitutional value systems are new ideas as well as public debates and polemics on these ideas that in the ripe historical period appeal to the critical mass of society; along the same lines, the progress is a direct result of embracing new values that spread thanks to such discussions. This conclusion applies despite the undisputable fact that horrors of injustice and violence often provide the principal impulse to the birth and promulgation of new ideas. 253
