Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
László Öllös: Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue (Conclusion)
Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue nal danger exceeds the alleged danger of ethnic Hungarians disrupting the state’s territorial integrity. For this pressure to be effective, it is necessary to demonstrate the actual danger of disintegration and separation of some of its territories and only then compare it to the consequences of granting full-fledged rights to ethnic Hungarians. Only in this kind of comparison does granting of full-fledged minority rights represent a lesser ‘threat’. Even in the past, this policy of force was way beyond Hungary’s actual potential, let alone the facts that it would sharply contradict internal principles of the EU and that one NATO member state cannot pose a military threat to another NATO member state. Within the framework of allied systems Hungary has identified with, it is impossible to create a greater threat than the already existing anxiety about ethnic Hungarians. Therefore, pursuing solely the policy of force may bring partial - though often very important - achievements but not a fundamental turning point that would lead to equality and national freedom of ethnic Hungarians. The point is that pressure alone can never lead to reconciliation between two nations. Advocates of the competitive strategy expected the democratization process to produce the critical change that could make neighbouring nations reconcile with their ethnic Hungarians and grant them full-fledged minority rights. They believed that if ethnic Hungarians’ representatives played an active role in removing the communist dictatorship and in subsequent political and economic processes that led to establishing a liberal democratic regime, then at some point along the way majority nations could grant fullfledged minority rights to ethnic Hungarians and recognize their national equality. Meanwhile, it has become obvious that even participation in the democratization process cannot alone bring about a change in the majority nation’s perception of ethnic Hungarians. Furthermore, the case of Slovakia shows that democratization process is not necessarily linear but from time to time it sways toward authoritarianism, encouraging within public opinion anti-Hungarian sentiments full of anxiety, intolerance and distrust and thus playing into the hands of power centralization. When the democratization process advances linearly, ethnic minorities may achieve certain - even significant - progress in terms of their social status but not a fundamental turning point that would make neighbouring nations recognize the rights necessary for ethnic minorities’ full-fledged development and essentially change their overall perception of the Hungarian nation. Most Slovaks’ hostility and suspicion with respect to ethnic Hungarians will not easily change into friendship and trust. An inevitable precondition to reconciliation is a change in the nation’s system of values and even a change in the currently prevailing concept of 249
