Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
Zsolt Gál: Argentina on the Danube - Populist Economic Policy as the Biggest Enemy of Sustainable Economic Growth
Zsolt Gál Both described hypotheses may explain different popularity of economic populism in three Central European countries. The ratio of government-financed and market-financed people is the worst in Hungary, slightly better in Slovakia and the best in the Czech Republic. Similarly, the highest share of voters with left-wing and paternalistic economic views is to be found in Hungary where these voters make up a majority of every relevant party’s supporters and their share in particular parties’ electorates does not differ essentially. Paternalistic attitudes also prevail in Slovakia but there are significant differences between individual parties’ electorates; for instance, supporters of the largest right-wing party (SDKU) rarely incline toward paternalism, which is one of chief characteristics of hard populist parties’ (i.e. SNS or HZDS) sympathizers. In the Czech Republic, voters are even more clearly divided along the line of subscribing to paternalistic values; based on these values, individual parties may be neatly placed on the right-left continuum. One thing is for sure: (economically) right-wing parties regularly post better election results here than in Slovakia. Although findings of public opinion surveys are not fully comparable (and therefore do not fully support the conclusion), everything indicates that paternalism is the strongest in Hungary and the weakest in the Czech Republic; also, it is the Czech political landscape that is the most clearly profiled on the right-left continuum of economic policy. While the two hypotheses largely complement each other, the two principal voter categories overlap significantly; those who live off government expenditures are likely to embrace strongly paternalistic views and tend to vote for populists while those who live off the market (i.e. mostly businesspersons and tradesmen) profess right-wing economic values and vote accordingly. Exceptions from these voting patterns are larger than the hypotheses would suggest and may probably be explained by other, less important factors such as political system (e.g. the combined electoral system in Hungary plays into the hands of two strongest parties, has a strong majorization effect and supports government stability), historical tradition (e.g. strict monetary and fiscal policy in the Czech Republic on the one hand and excessive deficits and higher inflation in Hungary on the other) but also accidental factors (e.g. the already described fragmentation of the left-wing populist bloc in Slovakia that in 2002 put in charge the most ‘pro-reform’ administration in the region so far). CoNClllSiON In 2007, Slovakia entered another populist cycle and started another round of fiscal expansion. While budgetary deficits of approximately 2% of GDP recorded in 2007 and 2008 seem rather low, the 8 to 10 percent economic 212
