Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
Zsolt Gál: Argentina on the Danube - Populist Economic Policy as the Biggest Enemy of Sustainable Economic Growth
Argentina on the Danube... Since 2002, Hungary’s political scene has been dominated by two principal archrivals, the MSZP and Fidesz; these two parties combined for almost 80% of all votes cast in the 2002 parliamentary elections and for 85% of all votes cast four years later (Országos Választási Bizottság, 2009). In the campaign before the 2006 elections, both parties got entangled in a verbal battle of populist promises. Socialists boasted about social results of their rule that had mined the country’s public finance system; trying to play an equal card, Fidesz promised the 14,h annual pensions. The only party that had opposed introduction of the 13th annual salaries and pensions and warned about foolishness of populist election promises, namely the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), struggled for its very survival and qualified to the assembly by the skin of its teeth, receiving 5.04% of the popular vote. Unless early elections are called, the upcoming parliamentary elections will be held in spring 2010. For the time being, voting preferences indicate that the socialists will suffer a crashing defeat while liberal free democrats (SZDSZ) will not even qualify to parliament. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, Fidesz stands a realistic chance to receive more than half of all votes; the far-right radical Jobbik party is also very likely to clinch parliamentary seats with approximately 10% of the popular vote while the MDF will continue to struggle for its very survival. It is plain to see that disenchanted former voters of socialists have not strengthened the ranks of liberals or conservatives (i.e. small parties with a right-wing economic program) but joined the camps of the undecided, Fidesz or even Jobbik. In other words, disillusioned voters of one populist party have joined other populist parties’ camps. This phenomenon is paralleled in Slovakia as the camp of HZDS supporters continues to shrink and the party is facing the risk of being relegated from the assembly after the 2010 elections; like in Hungary, though, its former voters are joining the camps of other populist parties, particularly that of SMER. The recent experience of Hungary and Slovakia shows that a failure of populist economic policies (i.e. general decline of GDP, employment, wages and income) does not compel voters to reject populism as such; the worst result of the failure is dooming some populist parties and/or their leaders but their supporters will join another party with a populist agenda. So, populist policies are continuously popular and politicians stand a good chance to benefit from them at least in terms of short-term political gains, mostly because of strong demand on the part of voters. The theory of public choice says that “political parties are firms on the political market while politicians are its entrepreneurs ... Political parties on the political market exploit resources and create party programs in an effort to gain political power” (Johnson, 1997, p. 236). 201
