Sárospataki Füzetek 15. (2011)
2011 / 4. szám - TANULMÁNYOK - Kónya Péter: Szlovák reformátusok a 17-18. században
Kierkegaard - a flag in the winds of change move forward. Socrates was right, “If a person does not become what he understands, he does not really understand it.”36 WORLDLINESS — not restricted to S. Kierkegaard’s critique of aesthetically reduced living and ethical pride, but includes his critique of the wide range of ways we seek false safety (as in numbers — the majority — and in facts). The ‘worldly’ person lives by trust in something finite (contingent), whether enjoyment, logic, success, technical possibilities, or any other pseudo-method of salvation. The worldly person does not create a new self. Questions i. ) SYSTEM — It is noticeable that S. Kierkegaard’s concepts are highly interrelated and form a unified framework or approach to reality. The more they are defined the more they seem tautological. So the question can be asked: has he fallen into systematic and synthetic thinking (which he so despised)? The answer is that the integration of his concepts empower him all the more to ‘socratically’ challenge and in fact disintegrate the false assurance we place in our own systems. There is a kier- kegaardian irony in the fact that S. Kierkegaard protested against philosophers and theologians, but spent his whole life writing on these two areas (mediated by psychology and packaged in a variety of literary genre). In an important way, S. Kierkegaard’s philosophy negated philosophy (ie., the assumption of the adequacy of reason). Similarly, his theology negated theology (ie., the idea that we can explain faith, doctrine, the ways of God, and perhaps even Godself (das Ding an Sich?) He uses his concepts to destruet the faqades of our lives. ii. ) LEAP — How can a ‘leap’ of faith be justified. Answer: it cannot be a totally blind leap (Tillich). It would be worth pursuing in S. Kierkegaard statements about the grounding of our leap of faith. He certainly says that the leap cannot be logically grounded; so it is likely intuitively grounded. iii) BEYOND ETHICS? — Is S. Kierkegaard’s ‘suspension of the ethical’ in the area of faith not dangerous, leading to fanaticism or religious terror? Answer: he basically means (like Augustine and numerous others) that when we fulfil the highest level of love for God and our neighbours, we are already beyond the minimal duty of the law. The Heidelberg Catechism comments in this way on the ten commandments. However, this does not answer the demand that Abraham sacrifice his son Isaac, which is beyond the logic of ethics. S. Kierkegaard leaves the question unanswered (unreconciled logically), except to say that God has that sovereign right. The New Testament letter to the Hebrews says that Abraham trusted that God could raise Isaac back to life. The Genesis account says that God provided a sacrificial ram. This in turn ends up to be the central message of the coming of Christ. iv.) DOCTRINE — What happens to religious doctrine (dogmas) with S. Kierkegaard? Doctrines about creation, sin, salvation, future hope, are taken out of the 36 Diary, 126. 2011/4 SÁROSPATAKI FÜZETEK 65
