Sárospataki Füzetek 15. (2011)
2011 / 4. szám - TANULMÁNYOK - Kónya Péter: Szlovák reformátusok a 17-18. században
Sawyer, Frank he dared to use his reason, but he crept back into the cage when he let ethics and the sublime point us back to the presence of God. One influence of Kant is that Schleiermacher (1768-1834) took a turn toward a more anthropocentric theology, dealing with religious experience. Kierkegaard deals very much with psychological and religious experience, but also with the leap of faith toward unity with the infinite. Kant’s acknowledgement of the sublime that fills us with awe opened this existential alternative to finding God avenues other than reason (alone). Kant spoke about ‘antinomies’ as unsolvable questions from the viewpoint of pure reason. These include: Is there a beginning and an end to time? To space? How can there be causality (determinative natural laws) and freedom? Is there a ‘necessary being’ as the ground of being? Kant ‘solves’ the question of antinomies by pointing out that two opposite answers could both sound logical and nonlogi- cal. Our lack of a final answer tells us that our experiences and our reasoning are limited and we do not know the ‘whole’. S. Kierkegaard could agree with Kant that ‘pure reason’ falls short of dealing properly with the transcendent realm; and indeed that we approach the transcendent via ‘practical reason’ — morality and the need for deciding about our lifeview and values. But for S. Kierkegaard, there is a dialectical relationship between the two ‘realms’ of the phenomenal and the noumenal, and rather than setting our epistemological limits according to the primacy of reason, S. Kierkegaard believed that ‘the leap’ beyond what we can reasonably know, is as such the very beginning of another kind of ‘Copernican revolution’, namely an ethical-spiritual one. By separating the noumenal from the phenomenal, Kant said that he was “making room for faith” (since pure reason can’t decide about antinomies nor about the realm of faith). Kierkegaard could agree that reason cannot grasp the truth of faith; but S. Kierkegaard did not like Kant’s over-ethical interpretation of faith. For S. Kierkegaard, Kant was still too tied down by reasoning even within his ‘practical reason’. Kant ended up with a reduced faith.9 S. Kierkegaard wanted to expand the role of intuitive faith. Kant was by no means denying all reasons for faith; but he wishes to keep these in the sphere of ‘practical reason’.10 11 Kant offered a moral proof — or rather reasoning, as to why we may (still) believe in God and immortality. But this is all part of the Enlightenment (and beyond) ‘battle of the proofs’ for theism or at least deism (or at least agnosticism). Supernatural revelation faded away as a ‘proof; leaving only natural reason, which as Kant pointed out, involves us in ‘antinomies’ in relation to the noumenal sphere or essence of reality goes. Kant stated that the question of morality leads irrevocably to religion, and he deduces God, human freedom, and immortality from man’s moral nature.11 Kierkegaard reacted against the idea of ‘proofs’ and a reasoned understanding of God; however, Kierkegaard does work with a correspondence between our moral nature and especially our existential throwness (as Heidegger would call it), and the need for God. 9 G. van den Brink, Orientatie in de filosofie (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2000), 224: “Het is in elk geval wel een zeer versmaid geloof dat Kant overhoudt.” 10 Cf. Keith Ward, God and the Philosophers (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 2009), 76ff. 11 Franklin L. Baumer, Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950 (New York: Macmillan, 1977), “Theism and Atheism’, 182-200. 56 SÁROSPATAKI FÜZETEK 2011/4
