Cseh Valentin szerk.: „70 éve alakult a MAORT” – tanulmányok egy bányavállalat történetéből (2009)
Lajos Srágli: Hungary's Economy, Politics and MAORT
/ l/iiifiins 1 :conomy, Politics and M. • 10RT using careful wording to those controlling industrial affairs about the situation of oil production and the company, as well as on production outlook. Deal ears, however, were turned to these warnings. And even if there had been anyone who would listen, thev could not have changed the situation significantly anyhow. Restitution, and the Soviet-Hungarian economic treaty concluded on August 27, 1945, which completely disregarded the country's load-bearing capacity, reflecting the major power constraints that evolved by the end of the war instead - along with the other agreements that came about in its track - included delivery obligations which led to 77.8% of Hungary's combined crude oil production being exported in the months of September-December 1945%' Until autumn 1945, MAORT performed its obligations as undertaken in the Accord, the Agreement, the Supplementary Accord, and the Supplementary Agreement to the full. The volume of withdrawn crude oil exceeded the country's internal needs continuously from 1940. The capital invested in the company surpassed the original notions significantly. A team of specialists, substantial in number, grew up beneath the wings of the company, and obtained know-how and experience that was close to unique in Hungarv. With its worker headcount coming close to five thousand people, MAORT played a significant role in ameliorating unemployment in the countryside. It constructed housing projects for its workers, officials, and engineers, thus bringing prosperity to affected settlements. The roads and bridges of the Zala oilfields bore the traces of the company's caretaking almost without exception. b: For MAORT, the spring of 1945 did not merely mean that the constraining expectations of one foreign power took the place of coercion bv another. Hardly six months were enough to take the company built before and during the war, and functioning exceptionally, to the brink ot distress, fundamental investments required for keeping production at previous levels, and the replacement of worn-out implements and equipment could not be realised for the lack of the necessary financial collateral. MA( )RT's disastrous financial situation made these problems unsolvable. Bank loans needed to be taken out for covering the most necessary expenses, and due salaries. Financial woes went on to become even more serious, even though the company's production should have covered the required financial collateral. It did not, however, receive a single penny for its products. The Soviet army did not pay anything for the fuel it took over from MAORT, nor for military purpose crude oil deliveries, but oil refineries did not pay the price of delivered crude either, since for the most part they were insolvent themselves. 153 The Agreement concluded in 1933, and the Supplementary Agreement granted MAORT the right to freely market crude oil produced over and above domestic supply and the treasury's share, which the company could do on its own. At this time, however, it was not able to exercise this right. The right of conducting restitution related and soviet exports was given to refineries in soviet interest, as well as MASZOVOL. Thus MAORT could not realise any substantial revenue from supplying the Red Army, from restitution, nor from exports. Its revenues could not even cover salaries. It had to cover even the most fundamental needs through loans. 1 '' Ol. Z 357 pack. 3. MOIM Arch. PS. 38/1. ,38/3.,Gy. 67.d.; SRÁGLI 2008 61-73. M( )IM Arch., PS. 42/9. MOIM Arch. PS. 38/10.,42/2., OLZ 356pack, 10.
