Cseh Valentin szerk.: „70 éve alakult a MAORT” – tanulmányok egy bányavállalat történetéből (2009)
Tamás Magyarics: The United States and the Issue of MAORT's Nationalisation
US leaders were at least as much surprised by the revolution breaking out as Hungary's. Between 1957 and 1962, the United States kept what was called the Hungarian Question on the UN's agenda, in other words it practically prevented the Kádár system's delegate from taking his seat at the General Assembly. That year, however, saw the striking of an implicit deal between the two states: Washington did not veto Hungary's UN membership, while Budapest granted amnesty to the vast majority of political convicts. At the same dme, complex and multifaceted negotiations commenced between the two parties concerning the normalising of relations: financial and property rights related talks constituted perhaps the most complicated chapter of the negotiations, and MAORT's case served as one of the subchapters thereof. The value of previously blocked assets, payments due to Hungarian citizens which were not disbursed previously by the United States (pensions, for example), moreover the value of what they called restitution related possessions - i.e. those that ended up in US occupied zones after World War Two, which the United States nonetheless did not return after the communists took over - constituted the Hungarian demands This latter item, by the wav, was the only more substantial amount, which - at least to some extent - set off the United States' legally much more substantiated, and larger value compensation demands. Washington announced war compensation claims on the one hand; and would have liked to receive compensation for US businesses lost in the course of nationalization on the other —MAORT belonged to this category, and comprised the largest compensation amount therein (USD 28 million; combined claims initially added up to USD 226 million ); it thirdly intended to get back debts accumulated in Hungary before World War Two; fourth it wanted to obtain the value of what were known as the Standstill loans granted to Hungary after the war; and finally the United States charged the value of an American military aircraft that was confiscated in 1951. Ownership rights related negotiations finally began with the involvement of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance in 1964, but because American demands far exceeded the Hungarian ones, Budapest was striving to wear the other party out. At the same time, Hungarian leaders would have liked to secure what is known as most favoured status in the bilateral exchange of goods due to political and economic reasons, although the only chance it could have had to do so would have been for it to settle the outstanding financial and ownership issues. American goals, on the other hand, were more of a political nature. Lyndon B.Johnson first talked publicly about the "bridge-building" policy in March, 1964, which in practice meant that the United States tried to develop a system of relations with Central and Eastern European satellite states as multifaceted and diverse as possible, in the interest of gradually weakening their ties to the Soviet Union. Above all else, the cold-war was a battle between the two parties for the "minds and hearts" of people, and in this relation the United States was even willing to make financial sacrifices. In other words: the fiscal attitude was overwritten by high politics strategy. Accordingly, the United States government announced in 1970 that it will decrease its compensation and financial demands drastically, to USD 37.5 million. As it turned out, even this amount was unacceptable to Hungary's leadership. High politics intervened yet again: Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger launched a political offensive to leverage the antagonism among communist superpowers - China and the Soviet Union - in 1972. The Republican administration wished to rule out any factors of secondary significance, which nevertheless could have been troublesome, in the interest of this comprehensive strategic goal. Finally, in
