Cseh Valentin szerk.: „70 éve alakult a MAORT” – tanulmányok egy bányavállalat történetéből (2009)

Lajos Srágli: Hungary's Economy, Politics and MAORT

The Hungarian state having contributed the 15% treasury- share due from MAORT in relation to production (the actual amount of which was a function of production) as part of the incorporated Soviet-Hungarian joint venture's share capital called for keeping crude oil output from the Transdanubian oilfields at level or even increasing it, and the Soviet company regularly demanded the share it was due. At the time the said treaties were concluded, the yield of crude oil fields worked by MA( )RT was already on the decline. The 10-13% per annum natural yield depletion was significantly increased by the unhealthy scale of production that was demanded. Until 1948, not even 20% of oil reserves in the oil fields was managed to be produced, but 50% of gas in the Budafa field, and 61% in the Lovászi field had been produced by that unie. The daily quantity of gas entering the atmosphere unutilised w

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as 550-600 thousand m\ which corresponded to the calorific value of approximately 120 tons of high quality straight coal. As a consequence of overproduction, there was a threat of so much crude oil becoming impossible to produce that would have been sufficient to cover the country's needs for a decade. Taking all of these things into account, Hungary's losses arising from them was estimated to be close to two billion Forints, even though the company's specialists emphasised that it could be avoided through rational production rates and the retrofitting of machinery equipment.

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9 They could only promise a production increase in case a new oilfield was discovered. That, however, would have required cash, but the company whose capital position was so strong once was now on the brink of bankruptcy. The situation was exacerbated by the state regulated oil price, which was set way too low, and lead to heated disputes: oil price per ton plummeted from HUF 342 in August 1946 - which was not high to begin with anyhow - to Hid 276 first, then to 226, and finally, bv February 1947, to HUF 170; moving right the other way compared to world market prices.

160 The situation of the country's crude oil supply developed much like MAORT's desperate circumstances. Although îvLAORT's dropping production still exceeded the country's internal demand, the first signs of shortage appeared as early as 1946. The reason simply lay in restitution, and the economic treaties that failed to take the nation's load-bearing capacity into consideration. Although the volume of crude oil products expended on restitution was reduced in 1946, it still exceeded 15% of production, at the same time 33.8% was exported, 11% was spent on supplying the Red Army, while domestic supply got 39.7%> of production. In budget year 1947/48, the Hungarian state was charged with the obligation to deliver some 342,309 tons of crude oil, i.e. more than two-thrids of its combined production, for restitution and export purposes.

161 Adding domestic needs to that meant that demand could have been satisfied with 45,000 tons of production a month, but ALYORT's production was close to two thousand tons short of this. Although the experts who were included in the preparations for foreign trade negotiations - officials from the Ministry of Industry more often than not - gave warning about the hazards of ill-considered agreements in their memoranda addressed to the Minister and the Secretary General of the Economic High Council, such were concluded nevertheless, and their terms were hardly advantageous in most cases. In the Soviet-Hungarian agreement oi 1947 on the delivery of some 260,000 tons a year, tor example, there was no domestic demand SRÁGLI 1998., ST.; M(MM Arch. Gy. 45/3..46/4.;

OL X1X-F-U I l.ci. "" OLXK-F-l-oo l.d.2.,5.d. "\,OLXIX-l- 1 oc> Ld.2.t "•' Magyar Ipar, Feb. 25,1948. pp. 13.; Ol. XIX-F-l-oo l.d.l, XIX-F-l-19.d.