Folia Theologica 18. (2007)
Zoltán Turgonyi: Compatibilism and Concursus Divinus - A (Hopefully) Possible Approach to the Problem of Freedom
COMPATIBILISM AND CONCURSUS DIVINUS 349 possible, but it can also render freedom a mere illusion. I illustrate these possibilities by an example. Let us suppose that I am sitting in my car by the traffic signals. When I see their green light, I start. Can we say that the oscillations of light (which I perceive as green colour) move immediately my muscles, inducing them to press my left foot on the coupling pedal, to push with my right hand the change-speed lever, to step with my right foot on the gas, and then I simply take notice of the starting of my car, as if I were watching a film? The answer is evidently negative. The information formed by the traffic signals' green light arrives to my mind, this green light is perceived by me in another way than, e.g., the green light of a neon sign above the door of a shop on the corner, I know what it announces, and 1 do not act automatically, but I make some deliberation, quick as it may be. Having perceived the green light I can make my muscles do the above-mentioned movements, but something else, too. All depends on various factors: on the presence or absence of an eventual traffic obstacle, on my intention to go ahead or backwards (if, e.g., I want to park) and so on. All these - and other - possibilities are confronted with my purpose in my mind, and one of them will be realized only after this confrontation. If I have something to do there, and if there is a parking place, I shall go backwards, if there is no place, I go ahead, and I go ahead also if I have something to do in another part of the town, supposing that there is no obstacle in front of me etc. We can see that all these are not interpretable on the level of mere physical processes. The numerous factors confronted with each other in my mind are mostly even undescribable by mere physical or biological laws, since they are ordered in higher relations. E. g. the symbolical meaning of the green light does not exist on physical level. In physical sense the red light would not hinder me (or my car) from starting. It is not on physical level that I am hindered by the red light; it can hinder me by the surplus it has in human minds. I confront different symbols of such kind - mostly existing in form of words - in my mind, I weigh, I contemplate the relations of possible decisions to my remote purpose (e. g. to the arriving at the final station of my voyage), and it is only after these acts of mind that one of the possibilities will be realized; the common existence of the traffic signals, the car, my eyes and my muscles in itself is not sufficient for this re-
