Folia Theologica 12. (2001)
Tibor Rászlai: Aquinas ont the Infallibilty of the Intellect
128 T. RASZLAI "The reason for this (veracity of sense perception) is obvious. For, each potency, as such, receives an intrinsic, non-incidental ordination to its proper object (per se ordinatur... ad proprium objectum). But whatever has this sort of ordination is always the cerning its proper object are not defective (non deficit)."16 The pressupposition of this argument seems to be that cognitive potencies are directed to gathering information about the world. The critical feature of potencies that are always veracious is that they always act in the same manner, barring the loss of the potency, as when sight or hearing is lost through damage to the corporeal organ. Apart from such impediments, error enters only in the case of potencies that are under the control of the will, and can act sometimes in one way, sometimes in another. Sense perception acting always in the same way invariably acheives its cognitive ends. Applying this to the intellect, Thomas writes: "The proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Thus, the intellect is not deceived concerning the quiddity of a thing (given that we are speaking of what is intrinsic and non-incidental to (the quiddity)."17 Thus, it is not, as the weaker reading suggests, that the FOI is veracious in correctly grasping its own ideas. Rather, it correctly apprehends the quiddities or essences of those things to which it has access through sense perception. These passages suggest that Aquinas's doctrine of the veracity of the intellect makes a strong epistemological claim: just as sight, given a healthy organ, correctly perceives the colors of things in its visual field, so the FOI apprehends the quiddities, the real essences of sensible things. This stronger reading of veracity is well-supported by lectio 11 of In De Anima, which contains one of Aquinas's most extensive discussion of the veracity of the intellect. 16 ST I., q. 85., a. 6. e 17 ST I., q. 85., a. 6. e
