Folia Theologica 12. (2001)

Tibor Rászlai: Aquinas ont the Infallibilty of the Intellect

FOLIA THEOLOGICA 12 (2001)

123

Tibor RÁSZLAI

AQUINAS ON THE INFALLIBILTY OF THE INTELLECT

"The intellect" - Aquinas frequently writes - "cannot be false".1 He is not saying, of course, that we are not capable of false judgments — it is as obvious to him as it is to us that we are; he is saying, rather, that the intellect in its first operation, in which it forms the ideas or concepts that are to be used in making judgments, cannot be false. Even so, the claim seems bold and surprising for inaccuracies in conceptualizations seem common enough. What is Aquinas's point?

Let us label this claim of Aquinas, whatever it amounts to, the doctrine of the indefectibility of the intellect, or just the indefectibility doctrine. At least two readings of the indefectibility doctrine can be distinguished: a weaker reading, which inadequacies in initial conceptualizations of natural kinds, such that, in light of further inquira and judgements, the earlier conceptual scheme will be shown to be in need of revision; and a stronger reading, which denies such a compatibility. The weak reading has won general acceptance by prominent twentieth-century scholars of Aquinas: Etienne Gilson1 2, Bernard Lonergan3, and Aladair MacIntyre4 have all adopted some version of it. In this paper, however, I shall argue for a stronger alternative.

1 This claim is most extensively discussed in Aquinas’s In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium, III, XI (hereafter this work will be referred to as In de Anima) and in Summa theologiae I., q. 85., a. 6. (hereafter ST). Among the other places one finds it are: ST I., q. 17., a. 3. and q. 58., a. 5.; Summa contra gentiles, I., 59. and III., 108. (hereafter ScG); Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, I. 12. (hereafter De Ver.); In Aristotelis libros peri hermineias, lectio III. (hereafter In Periherm.); and In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, VL, IV.

2 Thomistic Realism and the Critique of Knowledge. San Francisco, 1986, 199-203.

3 Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Notre Dame U. P., 1967, esp. ch. II.

4 First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues, Milwaukee, 1990,46-47.