Folia Theologica et Canonica 9. 31/23 (2020)
Sacra theologia
POPE BENEDICT XV’S NEGOTIATIONS... 65 and Turkey initiated peace, which act was delivered to Pope Benedict too. The reaction of Great Britain and France was entire rejection, as powers which believed in “total victory”. The pope could not risk the further negotiations’ success to get into arguing with the Entente Powers. The initiative therefore failed. The only hope was Austro-Hungary for a new peace negotiation, which had to contain concrete terms, sufficient for both sides. Focusing on Austro-Hungary and its new emperor, here I must refer to Robert A. Kann, who has composed a complex overview on the last years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1974. His research is particularly significant among Western scholars, because he was able to use not only the Western primary and secondary sources (including the archival material, supplemented with several monographs and articles, but he used several Hungarian sources and analysis too).19 Nevertheless, his point of view is based on the general impressions and concepts of the American, English and French sources, even he refers to many German and some Hungarian documents and analyses within his book. Nevertheless, he lists three secret negotiations of Karl I in 1917, in the following classification: I. unsuccessful secret negotiation; II. a “transitory” peace with Soviet Russia and Romania; III. unsuccessful secret negotiation.20 Regarding the failed initiatives of Karl I Robert A. Kann notes: “(...) Neither Charles nor his more energetic consort were disloyal to the German alliance, but the new emperor was not raised in the tradition of Austria as the presiding power in the German Confederation and of the Habsburgs as Holy Roman emperors. (...).” Therefore, Professor Kann concludes that the new emperor’s goal to achieve peace - in coordination with Germany or without that - was an unrealistic idea. Kann summarizes: a man who could not be trusted entirely by his own people, by Germany, and by the French and British leaders, was doomed to fail.21 I must emphasize regarding Kann’s conclusion that this image on Karl I basically reflects to the French and English concept on the young emperor. We must notice, the causalities of the Empire - like of Italy - were extremely high. The Austro-Hungarian armed force had been almost entirely perished during the war. Therefore, after one hundred years we should speak more objectively about Karl I, as it is precisely explained in the “position” of his beatification process. He was anxious and thirsty for peace as a good husband and father. His naivety appeared only in his trust that Austro- Hungary could exit from the war without cooperation of Emperor Wilhelm II. However, if we analyze the loss of Austro-Hungary, this naivety can be understandable. There are several statistics regarding number of causalities in the 19 Kann, R. A., A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918, London 1974. 468-483. 20 Kann, R. A., A History of the Habsburg Empire, 469. 21 Kann, R. A., A History of the Habsburg Empire, All.
