Folia Theologica et Canonica 6. 28/20 (2017)
IUS CANONICUM - Szabolcs Anzelm Szuromi, O.Praem., Historical development of the aggravating and extenuating circumstances in the canonical penal law
248 SZABOLCS ANZELM SZUROMI, O.PRAEM. tant that the ignorance is invincible (invincibilis) or easily won (vincibilis), because the invincible is always inculpable. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind the Regulae Iuris 13 from Liber Sextus: “Ignorantia facti, non iuris excusat”.37 D. 6 c. 2 of the Decretum Gratiani point out that the act - including the penalized act - is essentially determined by that influence - expressively indicated alcohol -, therefore is lacking the necessary level of rationality, it is not enough intentional basis to realize a penalized act with full responsibility - underlines Gregory the Great -,38 Obviously, in this case the inebriation could not be intentional correlation with the concrete crime. St. Ambrose’s opinion is same: those who are drunk cannot make the necessary decision to cause a fully imputably crime. However, it is essential that this state of inebriation had to be not created to avoid the fully imputably, as we can read in C. 15 q. 1 c. 7.39 St. Augustine repeats this principle in the De civitate Dei, which took place at Gratianus as C. 15 q. 1 C.9.4“ On “ignorantia” we have already expressed its extraordinary importance among the extenuating circumstances. At the beginning it is necessary to point out, that based on D. 37 c. 16 that the ignorance cannot release or extenuate among every type of circumstances the culpability.41 42 This very clear quotation from St. Augustine (f430) gives a fundamental remark, that only the not malicious ignorance is the one, which together with not sufficient knowledge - which is not imputable - causes extenuating circumstance, reducing the juridical consequence of the act. We must add to it St. Ambrose statement in C. 1 q. 4 c. 12, which gives the stress on the intention or will of the perpetrator. If this will does not intend to the crime - because there is some essential ignorance - the imputably and punishment should be reduced.43 Pope Nicolaus I explains in C. 11 q. 3 c. 102 his conviction in relation with this: the ignorance reduces the imputably if there was not accessible the elementary facts and information which could form into the good direction the will of the perpetrator. He notices, that for any act the human being must understand the consequence of his act, which has to be good, if he incapable this consequence because the not malicious lack of information, and the consequence is bad - means crime — he cannot have full responsibility.43 We can refer to St. Augustine again: if the sin or crime is unintentional - except it caused by intentional ignorance - it must reduce the imputably. St. Augustine adds to this: if the act is opposite to the will of the per37 Friedberg, Ae. (ed.), Corpus iuris canonici, I—II. Lipsiae 1879-1881 (repr. Graz 1959; hereafter: Friedberg) II. 1122. 38 Friedberg I. 10-11. 39 Friedberg 1.748. 40 Friedberg I. 748. 41 Friedberg I. 140. 42 Friedberg I. 422-423. 43 Friedberg 1.672.
