Folia Theologica et Canonica 6. 28/20 (2017)
IUS CANONICUM - Peter Artner, Psychical imputability and punishability in the current penal system of the Canon Law
232 PETER ARTNER The difference between the CIC (1917) and CIC (1983) became very clear right at the beginning of the Revision of the Code.22 The imputability, which is not automatically a juridical constitutive element of a delict23 must be free and deliberate. Can. 1322 is clear about this question: "Those who habitually lack the use of reason are considered to be incapable of a delict, even if they violated a law or precept while seemingly sane.” These people are incapable of responsibility, they are incompetent (non sui compos) and akin to infants as Can. 99 writes. This canon does not state that these persons are incapable of performing human acts24 or cannot be punished (nulli poena est obnoxious) but are incapable of a delict (delicti incapaces).2S On the other hand the majors (those are over 18 years of age) are considered basically fully responsible for their deeds. This is only a praesumptio iuris, which is supposed to be valid "donee contrarium probetur”. Studying this question from the other side: even all those minors and infants, who are below the prescribed age are considered as non sui compos though they may be mature enough for special juridical acts. "Whoever habitually lacks the use of reason is considered not responsible for oneself {non sui compos) and is equated with infants.” According to Can. 97 § 2: “A minor before the completion of the seventh year is called an infant and is considered not responsible for oneself (non sui compos).” These two canons define who are considered as absolutely not responsible for their deeds. These are praesumptiones iurìs et de iure, i.e. the contrary cannot be proven.26 Altering illnesses might be schizophrenia, paranoia, maniac (or bipolar) depression, etc. Canon 1322 deals with the most radical situation: the insane person or the one who is habitually deprived of the use of reason. It does not sate a refutable legal presumption. Rather, the person habitually deprived of the use of reason is viewed as incapable of a delict. Such a person is not in possession of his or her faculties and hence cannot function freely and deliberately.27 Even if they appeared rational at the time of the offence, they had the so called lucidum intervallum, a moment of episodic lucidity, no penalty can be imposed, the community puts no burden on the insane.28 This provision of law does not make a judgement concerning whether or not the person has morally sinned or not, just 22 Communicationes 2 ( 1970) 103. 23 De Paolis, V. - Cito, D., Le sanzioni nella Chiesa, 138. 24 Marzoa, Á. - Miras, J. - Rodrîguez-Ocana, R. (ed.), Exegetical Commentary, IV/1. 276 (Mar- zoa, Á.). 25 Calabrese, A., Diritto penale canonico, Città del Vaticano 1996. 51. 26 Otaduy, J. - Viana, A. - Sedano, J., Diccionario General de Derecho Canònico, IV. 463 (Santos Diez, J. L.). 27 Beal, J. P.-Coriden, J. A.-Green, T. J. (ed.), New Commentary, 1541 (Green, T. J.). 28 Calabrese, A., Diritto penale canonico, 51.
