Folia Theologica et Canonica 2. 24/16 (2013)
SACRA THEOLOGIA - Sebastian Walsh, O.Praem., “Fidelissimus Discipulus Eius”: Charles De Köninck’s Exposition of Aquinas’ Doctrine on the Common Good
144 SEBASTIAN WALSH, O.PRAEM. In a rather striking text illustrating this point, St. Thomas calls attention to an error by Origen in which he concludes that angels and human souls were the same in species: “Origen, wanting to avoid the errors of ancient heretics who had attributed the diversity of things to diverse principles introducing the diversity of good and evil, posited that the diversity of all things had proceeded from free will. For he said that God made all rational creatures equal from the beginning, and that some, by adhering to God, made progress in better things by way of their clinging to God; but certain others, receding from God by their own free will, fell into worse things, to the degree that they departed from God. And therefore, certain of them were incorporated into the heavenly bodies, certain others into human bodies, and certain others were perverted even to the wickedness of the demons. Nevertheless, all were uniform from their creation in the beginning. But it can be seen how in respect to this position, Origen attended to the good of singular creatures, overlooking the consideration of the whole. Yet a wise architect not only considers the good of this part or that part in the disposition of the parts, but much more the good of the whole. Hence, a builder does not make all parts of the house equally precious, but more and less according as it befits the good disposition of the house.”” It is not by accident that Origen also held that hell was not eternal. Both errors follow necessarily from the position that the ultimate good in the universe is the private good of the singular parts of the universe. Conclusion This brief survey of St. Thomas’ teaching on the common good with the help of Professor De Köninck manifests that not only are there several analogous meanings of the expression common good, but also manifests that there is a primary meaning which, though least known to us, has the fullest notion of common good. It is most perfectly common because it is communicable in the highest degree: to being as such. It most fully has the notion of goodness because it is most of all perfective, bringing the whole being of each thing to its perfection in the mode of an end. It is this primary meaning of the common good that has significance far beyond the boundaries of ethics or political science. It is a metaphysical concept of the greatest importance that even touches upon and is of greatest service in Theology. For the object sought by the wise man in First Philosophy is the first and most universal cause of all beings. And this cause is some good. And this good, precisely as common, is the highest beatitude of all rational creatures, and is the ultimate reason for being of all things. 29 Disputed Questions on the Soul, a.7, c.
