Folia Theologica et Canonica 2. 24/16 (2013)

SACRA THEOLOGIA - Sebastian Walsh, O.Praem., “Fidelissimus Discipulus Eius”: Charles De Köninck’s Exposition of Aquinas’ Doctrine on the Common Good

“FIDELISSIMUS DISCIPULUS EIUS”

139

For naturally the good of any one thing is its act and perfection. Moreover, anything acts from this: that it is in act. Furthermore, by acting it pours out being (esse) and goodness into other things. Hence, also it is a sign of perfection of something that it is able to produce its like: as is clear from the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Meteorology. But the notion of the good is from this: that it is desirable. This is the end, which also moves an agent to acting. Because of which the good is said to be diffusive of itself and of being (esse).”17

In this text the good is considered under two aspects, its nature and its notion or definition (ratio). According to its nature a good thing is something in act, and it therefore has the capacity to move other things from potency to act as an efficient cause. According to its proper notion or definition, however, the good is something desirable. Under this latter formality, the good is a cause in another mode. St. Thomas makes this clear in a second text from his De Ventate:

“When it is said that the good is diffusive according to its notion, diffusion is not to be understood as it implies the operation of an efficient cause, but as it implies the relationship of a final cause. And such a diffusion is not by the mediation of some superadded power. Moreover, the good signifies the diffusion of a final cause, and not of an agent cause: first since an efficient [cause], insofar as it is such, is not the measure and perfection of a thing, but rather its beginning, and then since the effect participates in the efficient cause according to assimilation of form only, but a thing obtains the end according to its whole being (esse), and the notion of the good consists in this.”18

Here St. Thomas carefully distinguishes what is meant by the self-diffusion of the good as final cause from the self-diffusion of an efficient cause. While implying that the notion of self-diffusion is more apparent to us in the case of efficient cause, he nevertheless denies that all self-diffusion of causes is reduced to a kind of efficient causality. More than this, he even indicates that the more profound sense of self-diffusion is attributed to the good as final cause, for the good brings the whole being to its whole perfection.

In summary, it can be said that the good, as something in act (which every good thing is), diffuses itself by way of efficient and exemplar causality.19 It can even be said that this is the sense of diffusion which is better known to us. This explains why we tend to fall back upon this sense in which the good is a cause.20 De Köninck was aware of this and was careful to keep in mind that the good,

17 S.C.G.. 1.37.

18 De Ventate q.21, a.l, ad4.

19 See S.Th., la, q. 19, a.2,c.

20 This seems to have been the cause of one of the more serious errors of Fr. Eschmann, to whom De Köninck was responding in this article.