Folia Canonica 11. (2008)
PROCEEDINGS OF TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. "Questioni attuali intorno al Battesimo" Budapest, 4th February 2008 - Michael Carragher: Intention of the Minister as Substantive Element of Baptism
210 MICHAEL CARRAGHER Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have “volition,” whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus “enjoyment” regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus “intention” regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else. Again.7 Consequently this word “intention” indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end. The difference between intention and wishing8 Intending differs from willing, in that willing is directed towards an end unconditionally, whereas intending signifies a relationship to end just insofar as there is an end to which means are referred. So there is no intending until there is adoption of means typically by choice. As a state of affairs my being healthy is something distinct from the means.9 But insofar as my health is the intelligible benefit for which I choose the means, the point of my choosing and doing the end is simply an aspect of one and the same object of volition. There can be intention while many of the means necessary to put it into effect remain undecided, (this I can decide [choose] to do something about my toothache — procedural decision — before setting about finding a painkiller or a 7 Summa Theologiae 1-11, q. 12, a. 1 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem. 8 De veritate q. 22 a. 13c: Et ita intendere in hoc differt a velle, quod velle tendit in finem absolute; sed intendere dicit ordinem in finem, secundum quod finis est in quem ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. See also Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ordinare est rationis, sed ordinari potest esse voluntatis; et sic intentio ordinationem importat. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod intentio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem ordinantem ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem ipsum; sed electio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem comparantem ea quae sunt in finem ad invicem: et propter hoc intentio et electio differunt. ‘‘Summa Theologiae 1—11, q. 12, a.4 ad 3; Ad tertium dicendum quod motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre secundum principium et finem, ut ascensio et descensio, sicut dicitur in III physic. Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio. Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio. A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end, as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. Ill, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is called “choice”: but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called “intention.” A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice.
