Magyar László szerk.: Orvostörténeti közlemények 158-165. (Budapest, 1997-1998)

Antall József: Egy évszázados per — A Görgey-kérdés tegnap és ma

SUMMARY Artúr Görgey (1818—1916) seems to remain one of the most disputed figure of Hungarian historiography and literature. The former officer of the Habsburg Imperial Army, who changed his military career for lectureship in chemistry, joined the Hungarian Armed forces in 1848. He was soon promoted general and later (when still only 31 years old), commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces. In August 1849 he capitulated the Russian intervention army, which outnumbered twice the Hungarian, and by so doing he put an end to the Hungarian war of independence. Although the capitulation was reasoned by military, economic and political necessities, it was immediately questioned by many, most of all by Kossuth. Kossuth, who was equally clear with the hopelessness of the struggle, transferred the supreme power to Görgey and then fled the country. The idea was, perhaps, to keep the political leadership untouched by the humiliation that the capitulation would obviously bring about. Nevertheless when he had arrived to Turkey he blamed Görgey for the defeat and called him a traitor. For Kossuth was becoming an almost mythical national hero his opinion was very much influential and this opened a long dispute and aversion to Görgey's decision. The downfall of the revolution caused Hungary to loose her centuries old constitutional self-government, and those who exposed themselves in the struggle were jailed, sent to compulsory military service in the imperial army, or were executed. It was Görgey's special personal tragedy that while he was given a pardon and was taken into a more or less comfortable custody at Graz many of his fellow generals were executed. He spent the rest of his life, (actually more than sixty years) in retirement, and was no more involved in political, let alone military actions. This recently founded paper by József Antall was written in the 1960s. Antall, the late director general of our Institute, was the editor-in-chief of our journal (hence the reason why it is now published in a medical historical journal) and later the first democratically elected Hungarian prime minister after the fall of communism. He repeatedly tried to publish this paper until the 1980s, but was always refused. The reservation was probably caused by the fact that its topic was a loose reminder of the 1956 revolution. The paper investigates the motives that led Görgey to the capitulation. Antall searches that how the decision was determined by his character, and whether it was, in terms both of political and military points a reasonable idea. The major contribution, however, is the critique of Görgey's figure in Hungarian historiography. Both the tradition which has yielded the conflicting hero of "the revolutionary Kossuth " with "the traitor Görgey ", and the opposite one, which esteemed Görgey as "a solid and sober soldier" who was quarreling with "Kossuth, the gambler and irresponsible political manoeuvrist" resulted serious harms to Hungarian historiography and, which was more severe to Antall, even to Hungarian political thought and capability of political action. Antall makes a difference between the virtues of a soldier and those of a politician concluding that it is equally false to require the merits of a politician from the military man, and vice versa. He claims that adequate political and military actions do not necessarily overlap each other, and emphasizes that Görgey is an outstanding example for this. He is convinced that taken apart enthusiasm, revolutionary belief, and the cold calculation of a